

LONDON RESILIENCE



PREPARING FOR EMERGENCIES



LESLP Major Incident Procedure Manual

Major Incident Procedure Manual

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The version 9 update of the Major Incident Procedure Manual, released in July 2015, takes note of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP).

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Contents

1. Introduction	6
2. Major incidents	8
2.1 Definition	8
2.2 Declaration	8
2.3 Stages	8
3. Main functions of the emergency services and other agencies	9
3.1 General	9
3.2 Police	9
3.3 Fire Brigade	9
3.4 Ambulance Service	9
3.5 The Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)	10
3.6 The National Health Service (NHS)	10
3.7 Local Authority	10
3.8 Notification and immediate response	11
3.9 Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO)	11
3.10 Functions	11
3.11 Recovery	11
3.12 H.M. Coastguard	12
3.13 Transport for London	12
4. Working Together	13
4.1 Key principles	13
4.2 Joint Decision Model	14
4.3 Assess risks and develop a working strategy	14
4.4 Consider powers, policies and procedures	15
4.5 Identify options and contingencies	15
4.6 Take action and review what happened	15
5. Scene management	16
5.1 Cordons	17
5.2 Inner cordon	17
5.3 Outer cordon	18
5.4 Traffic cordon	18
5.5 Logistical Support	18
5.6 Rendezvous point (RVP)	18
5.7 Marshalling area	18
5.8 Multi-Agency Marshalling Area (MAMA)	19
5.9 Multi-Agency Holding Area (MAHA)	19
5.10 Forward Command Point (FCP)	19
5.11 Siting of vehicles	19
5.12 Scene Access Control	20
6. Command and Control	21
6.1 Initial control	21
6.2 Levels of Command	21
6.3 Operational (Bronze)	21
6.4 Tactical (Silver)	21
6.5 Strategic (Gold)	21
6.6 Inter-agency resources	22
7. Coordinating groups	23
7.1 General	23
7.2 Strategic Coordinating Group	23
7.3 Tactical Coordinating Group	24
8. Communications systems	26
8.1 General	26
8.2 Operational Communications Security	26
8.3 Terrorism Incidents	26
8.4 City of London Police (COLP)	26
8.5 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)	26
8.6 British Transport Police (BTP)	27
8.7 London Fire Brigade (LFB)	27

8.8	London Ambulance Service (LAS)	27
8.9	MPS Special Operations Room (MP-SOR)	28
8.10	Inter-agency command	28
8.11	Liaison officers	28
8.12	Local Authority communications	29
8.13	Telecom assistance	29
8.14	MTPAS Mobile Telephony Priority Access Scheme	29
8.15	Radio Amateur's Emergency Network (RAYNET)	29
9.	Casualty clearance	30
9.1	Categories	30
9.2	Uninjured	30
9.3	Casualties (Injured)	30
9.4	Deceased and Human Remains	32
9.5	Evacuees	34
9.6	Rest Centre	34
9.7	Survivor Reception Centre	34
9.8	Friends and Relatives Reception Centre	35
9.9	Casualty Bureau	35
9.10	Humanitarian Assistance Centre	36
9.11	Community Assistance Centre	36
10.	Helicopters	37
10.1	Police helicopters	37
10.2	Military helicopters	37
10.3	London Air Ambulance (LAA) - Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS)	38
10.4	HM Coastguard search and rescue helicopters	38
10.5	Temporary heli-pads	38
10.6	Emergency flying restrictions	38
11.	Investigation	39
11.1	Evidence	39
11.2	Police responsibilities	39
12.	Safety	40
12.1	Safety and health	40
12.2	Factories and other industrial sites	40
12.3	Fire Brigade "HMEP" officers	41
12.4	Rail Incidents – safe systems of work	41
12.5	Railway Industry	42
13.	Other assistance	43
13.1	Voluntary Aid Societies (VASs)	43
13.2	Churches - Multi Incident Plan	44
13.3	Utility companies	44
14.	Media Liaison and Public Information	45
14.1	Introduction	45
14.2	Joined up Communication	45
14.3	Statements	45
14.4	Media RVP	46
14.5	Multi Agency Media Centre	46
14.6	Designated Spokespeople	46
14.7	Press Briefings at a Scene	46
14.8	Preliminary Briefings	47
14.9	Tailored Messages	47
14.10	Joint Emergency Services Press Briefings	47
14.11	Citizen Journalists	47
14.12	Media Accreditation	48
14.13	Release of Casualty Figures	48
14.14	Liaison on Scene	48
14.15	Local Authority	48
14.16	Transport for London	49
14.17	Tactical and Strategic Co-ordinating Group Meetings	49
14.18	Press Debrief	49
15.	Occupier's response to an incident	50
15.1	General	50
15.2	The Inner cordon	50

15.3	The Outer cordon	50
16.	Debriefing	51
17.	Welfare of responders.....	52

Appendices

Appendix A – CBRN Incidents	53
Appendix B – Incidents on Railways	55
Appendix C – Aircraft Incidents	56
Appendix D - River Thames Incident	58
Appendix E – Flooding.....	64
Appendix F – Military Assistance to a London Major Incident	67
Appendix G - Glossary	70
Appendix H - Marine Terminology	74

1. Introduction

- 1.1 The London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) was formed in 1973 and consists of representatives from the Metropolitan Police Service, City of London Police, British Transport Police, the London Fire Brigade, the London Ambulance Service and local authorities. The Port of London Authority (PLA), Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), Transport for London (TfL), Military, Voluntary Sector and Greater London Authority (GLA) are also represented. LESLP has the ability to invite representatives from other agencies into the group when required, dependent on the nature and type of incident. The group meets once every three months under the chair of the Metropolitan Police Service, Emergency Preparedness Operational Command Unit.
- 1.2 This latest version of LESLP has been produced to incorporate the [Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles \(JESIP\)](#). The JESIP Doctrine focuses on police, fire and ambulance interoperability in the early stages of the response to a major or complex incident. Its purpose is to provide emergency service commanders with a framework to enable them to respond together as effectively as possible. However, the principles are also applicable to the wider range of Category 1 and 2 response organisations and can be applied to smaller scale incidents, wide-area emergencies, and pre-planned operations.
- 1.3 The programme was set up at the Home Secretary's request following a number of public enquiries which found joint working between the three emergency services would enhance the collective ability to save lives and reduce harm. "Major and complex incidents do not happen very often, but when they do we need to ensure that we have the most efficient, effective and, most importantly, joined-up response that is possible. The public will expect no less". JESIP has the full support of Chief Officers and Government Departments; the Home Office, Cabinet Office, Department for Communities and Local Government and the Department of Health.
- 1.4 Key changes introduced by JESIP are: the use of 5 interoperability principles: **Co-location, Communication, Co-operation; Shared Situational Awareness and a Joint Understanding of Risk**. Adoption of a single standard mnemonic: **METHANE**, for passing key information about major or complex incidents to control rooms or partners, a change of name for command roles (Strategic (Gold), Tactical (Silver) and Operational (Bronze) and the use of a common decision making model: The **Joint Decision Model (JDM)**.
- 1.5 JESIP does not replace LESLP, it enhances it by providing a nationally agreed approach that incorporates the original aims of LESLP and ensures that staff from the different Emergency Services train and exercise together to deliver an improved multi agency response.
- 1.6 The structure for managing the local multi-agency response to emergencies is based upon the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated guidance, which imposes a legal duty on Category 1 responders to assess risk, plan for emergencies and to co-operate and share information with other responders.
- 1.7 The Act is supported by two sets of guidance; 'Emergency Preparedness' and 'Emergency Response & Recovery' (ER&R). Emergency Preparedness deals with the pre-emergency (planning) phase. ER&R describes the multi-agency framework for responding to and recovering from emergencies in the UK.
- 1.8 Each organisation has its own arrangements for the response to a Major Incident. The purpose of this document is to describe the agreed procedures and arrangements for the effective coordination of their joint efforts which operate within the [London Resilience Strategic Coordination Protocol](#). In this way the overall response of the emergency services will be greater than the sum of their individual efforts, to the benefit of the public.
- 1.9 This Manual provides summaries of the responses and responsibilities of each of the emergency services at the scene of a major incident, as well as an outline of the support role offered by local authorities and other agencies. It should be read in conjunction with the [Strategic Coordination Protocol](#) (which describes arrangements for wider coordination beyond the incident scene) and specific arrangements detailing planned responses to certain incidents. These arrangements summarise the processes in place for a coordinated response to and recovery from emergencies in London.

- 1.10 There are many serious and protracted incidents which do not meet the criteria for a major incident but which would nonetheless warrant a coordinated effort from the services involved. These events have impacted on the emergency services and local authorities, and necessitated the implementation of special arrangements to manage them. Clear benefits have been achieved from the use of this Manual in maintaining the continuity of a coordinated approach.
- 1.11 This Manual has been prepared for the information and guidance of the emergency services and local authorities but may be used by other organisations responding to a major incident. It must be remembered that the procedures within this Manual are generally related to activities at, or ancillary to, the scene of the incident, that have a bearing on a number of the agencies involved. Detailed descriptions of single service functions are not included. The Manual includes references to roles and responsibilities of some non-emergency service organisations. The list of organisations included is not exhaustive and it is recognised that a wide range of organisations are likely to be involved in supporting the response of the emergency services.
- 1.12 LESLP recognises that every major incident is different and has its own unique features. The advice contained within this Manual should only be regarded as guidance. It is designed to offer a framework within which those who are responsible for the successful resolution of the incident are able to work together with maximum efficiency.
- 1.13 The definitions and procedures contained in this Manual, dealing with major incidents, apply equally to arrangements which should be put in place to ensure the speedy resolution of seemingly minor incidents.
- 1.14 It should be noted that the procedures set out in this Manual would apply to major incidents initiated by terrorist acts.

2. Major incidents

2.1 Definition

2.1.1 A major incident is an event or situation requiring the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services. Typically, a Major Incident involves one or more of the following:

- Involvement, either directly or indirectly, of large numbers of people;
- The rescue and transportation of a potentially large number of casualties;
- The large scale combined resources of Police, London Fire Brigade and London Ambulance Service;
- The mobilisation and organisation of the emergency services and support services, for example: local authority, to cater for the threat of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people; and transport operators actively managing the road and rail networks to support emergency response;
- The handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated both from the public and the news media - usually made to the police.

Acts of terrorism, including suspected involvement of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear devices, are subject to a specific multi-agency response supported by HM Government. This response is reinforced by the principles contained in this Manual (see Appendix A).

2.2 Declaration

2.2.1 A major incident may be declared by one or more emergency services, if any of the criteria outlined above has been satisfied. In certain circumstances, such as flooding, the local authority may declare a major incident.

2.2.2 Despite the fact that what is a major incident to one of the emergency services may not be so to another, each of the other emergency services will attend with an appropriate pre-determined response and notify relevant support organisations, such as Local Authorities or Transport operators. This is so even if they are to be employed in a standby capacity and not directly involved in the incident.


2.2.3 London Resilience Team (LRT) must be notified of all formally declared major incidents in line with the [Strategic Coordination Protocol](#).

2.3 Stages

2.3.1 Most major incidents can be considered to have four stages:

- the initial response;
- the consolidation phase;
- the recovery phase; and
- the restoration of normality.

2.3.2 An investigation into the cause of the incident, together with the attendant hearings, may be superimposed onto the whole structure.



3. Main functions of the emergency services and other agencies

3.1 General

3.1.1 Rescue will most frequently be the prime function required of the emergency services. Responsibility for the rescue of survivors lies with the London Fire Brigade (LFB). The care and transportation of casualties to hospital is the responsibility of the London Ambulance Service (LAS). Police will ease these operations by coordinating the emergency services, local authorities and other agencies.

3.2 Police

3.2.1 The primary areas of police responsibility at a major incident are:

- The saving of life together with the other emergency services;
- The co-ordination of the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations acting in support at the scene of the incident;
- To secure, protect and preserve the scene and to control sightseers and traffic through the use of cordons;
- The investigation of the incident and obtaining and securing of evidence in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable;
- The collection and distribution of casualty information;
- The identification of the dead on behalf of Her Majesty's (HM) Coroner;
- The prevention of crime;
- Family liaison; and
- Short-term measures to restore normality after all necessary actions have been taken.

3.3 Fire Brigade

3.3.1 The primary areas of LFB responsibility at a major incident are:

- Life-saving through search and rescue;
- Fire fighting and fire prevention;
- Rendering humanitarian services;
- Detection, identification, monitoring and management of hazardous materials and Protecting the environment;
- Provision of qualified scientific advice in relation to HAZMAT incidents via their Scientific advisors;
- Salvage and damage control;
- Safety management within the inner cordon; and
- To maintain emergency service cover throughout the LFB area and return to a state of normality at the earliest time.

3.4 Ambulance Service

3.4.1 The primary areas of responsibility for the LAS at a major incident may be summarised as:

- To save life together with the other emergency services;
- To provide treatment, stabilisation and care of those injured at the scene;
- To provide appropriate transport, medical staff, equipment and resources;

- To establish an effective triage sieve and triage sort system to determine the priority evacuation needs of those injured and to establish a safe location for casualty clearing i.e. triage sort area;
- To provide a focal point at the incident for all National Health Service (NHS) and other medical resources;
- To provide communication facilities for NHS resources at the scene, with direct radio links to hospitals, control facilities and any other agency as required;
- To nominate and alert the receiving hospitals from the official list of hospitals to receive those injured and inform the other agencies;
- To arrange the most appropriate means of transporting those injured to the receiving and specialist hospitals;
- To maintain emergency cover throughout the LAS area and return to a state of normality at the earliest time; and
- To act as a portal into the wider health services including Public Health England (PHE), and in the event of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incident advise on the convening of the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC), which will be able to advise and lead as far as health advice is concerned.
- To provide a Mobile Emergency Response Incident Team (MERIT)

3.5 The Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

3.5.1 The STAC is a strategic group chaired by the NHS, composed of representatives from a range of organisations and specialties who are able to give coordinated authoritative advice on the health aspects of an incident to the Police Incident Commander, the NHS and other agencies.

3.5.2 STAC is activated through Public Health England (PHE) via LAS Control.

3.6 The National Health Service (NHS)

3.6.1 For the NHS, a major incident is defined as the following:

- When the number or type of casualties overwhelm or threaten to overwhelm normal services, special arrangements are needed to deal with them;
- When an incident may pose a threat to the health of the community;
- The Health Service itself may suffer serious internal disruption.

3.7 Local Authority

3.7.1 Local Authorities have 7 duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004:

- To cooperate with other local responders to enhance coordination and efficiency;
- Ensure information is shared with other local responders to enhance coordination;
- Carry out risk assessments;
- Have emergency plans in place;

- Have business continuity management arrangements in place;
- Have arrangements in place to be able to warn and inform the public in the event of an Emergency;
- Provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations regarding business continuity management.

3.8 Notification and immediate response

3.8.1 Local Authorities can be contacted 24/7 to initiate a response capability.

3.8.2 Local Authority Gold and the LLACC

Where an incident has pan-London implications, the London Local Authority Gold structure may be invoked. This will involve the on-call Chief Executive attending Strategic Coordination Group meetings on behalf of all London Local Authorities. The London Local Authority Coordination Centre may be invoked in support of LA Gold and to coordinate the response of all Local authorities.

3.9 Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO)

3.9.1 The LALO is a senior representative of the affected borough who is able to react to requests for local authority assistance and is the on-scene liaison point for the Council

3.9.2 The LALO is:

- Required to attend Tactical Coordination meetings or the Forward Command Point (FCP) if established, to represent the local authority;
- The link between the incident, the Borough Emergency Control Centre (BECC) and the London Local Authority Coordination Centre (LLACC);
- in possession of effective communications with senior levels of the local authority;

3.10 Functions

3.10.1 It is in the later stages of a major incident (the recovery period and return to normality) that the local authority's involvement may be prolonged and extensive. The services and staff the local authority may be able to provide are based upon a wide range of skills and resources drawn from its day-to-day operations such as:

Professional	Physical resources	Caring
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical and engineering advice • Building control 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rehousing and accommodation needs • Provision of reception centres • Transport 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Welfare and financial needs • Psychosocial support centres
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highways services • Public health and environmental issues 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social services • Help lines

3.11 Recovery

3.11.1 As the incident progresses towards the recovery phase, the emergency services will need to consider a formal handover to the local authority in order to facilitate the authority's leading role in the return to normality, the rehabilitation of the community and restoration of the environment in accordance with non-statutory guidance to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Emergency Response and Recovery)

3.12 H.M. Coastguard

3.12.1 See Appendix D.

3.13 Transport for London

3.13.1 Role

Transport for London has the duties of a Category 2 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004).

3.13.2 Notification

Transport for London can be contacted 24/7 via its various business units, who in turn will notify each other of the declaration of a Major Incident and initiate an appropriate response.

3.13.3 TfL Gold and the Palestra Event Liaison Facility

Where an incident has pan-London implications, a lead Chief Officer within TfL will be nominated as TfL Gold. The Palestra Event Liaison Facility may be activated in support of TfL business units and contractors, to coordinate the response to impacts to the transport network.

3.13.4 On Site Silver Manager

The On Site Silver Manager is a senior manager representing any affected TfL business units and is able to respond to requests for TfL assistance and is the liaison point for TfL and its contractors.

The On Site Silver Manager is:

- Required to attend Tactical coordination meetings / the Forward Command point (FCP) if established, to represent TfL;
- The link between the Palestra Event Liaison Facility and the appropriate TfL Control Centre;
- In communication with senior levels of the affected TfL business unit(s).

3.13.5 Functions

TfL's involvement may be prolonged and extensive depending on the type of major incident and whether it involved TfL infrastructure or that TfL has been requested to support the response or recovery. The services, staff and contractors that TfL may be able to provide are based upon a wide range of skills and resources drawn from its day-to-day operations such as:

Professional	Physical	Welfare
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Technical and engineering advice• Construction operations• Road space and traffic management• Rail infrastructure operation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Passenger transport vehicles• Engineering and plant equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• TfL Care Team

4. Working Together

4.1 Key principles for effective multi agency working are:

Co-location, Communication, Co-ordination to gain a Shared Situational Awareness and Joint Understanding of Risk

4.1.1 Co-location

Meet at or near the scene face to face.

4.1.2 Communication

Share information with partners promptly.

Establish and monitor a Joint Emergency Service Airwave channel (through MetCC).

4.1.3 Co-ordination

Understand the key priorities, activities and issues of partner agencies.

4.1.4 Shared Situational Awareness

Situational awareness is about having appropriate answers to the following questions:

- What has happened?
- What are the impacts?
- What might happen?
- What are the risks?
- What is being done about it?

4.1.5 Shared Situational Awareness is achieved by sharing information and understanding to build a stronger multi-dimensional awareness of events, implications, risks and outcomes.

4.1.6 Joint Understanding of Risk

4.2 Joint Decision Model (JDM)

- 4.2.1 The Joint Decision Model provides a common framework for decision making at incidents attended by multiple agencies. It establishes a common language to ensure that decisions are reached in a structured way and in a manner understood by all, i.e. What do we know? What do we need to do and the associated risks? What are the enabling or constraining powers, policies or procedures? What options are appropriate? Take action and check it is working?



4.2 Gather and share information and intelligence

- 4.2.1 Representatives from all blue light services at a scene should meet face to face at the earliest opportunity to share information and understanding.
- 4.2.2 The mnemonic **METHANE** should be used as a structure to pass information to control rooms and when sharing information between emergency responders, to contribute to a shared situational awareness.

M	Major Incident declared (or hospitals to standby)
E	Exact location of the incident, with map references if possible.
T	The type of incident with brief details of types and numbers of vehicles, trains, buildings, aircraft etc.
H	Hazards present or suspected
A	Access routes and suitable provisional rendezvous points (RVPs)
N	Approximate number, type and severity of casualties
E	Emergency Services present and required including local authorities and transport operators. Consider MERIT. Special equipment and services i.e. HEMS, Emergency Planning Advisor, BASICS, ECV, ESV, HART

4.3 Assess risks and develop a working strategy

- 4.3.1 **Assess risks.** Known HAZARDS should be promulgated immediately through a METHANE report. Each service should then undertake their own dynamic risk assessment to share with other Agencies:

- a) **Identification of Hazards** - share promptly through METHANE
- b) Each Service undertakes a **Dynamic Risk Assessment** to identify:
Tasks/objectives to be achieved - the hazards presented by them and the likelihood of harm from them and if appropriate, will **Apply control measures**; these need to be promulgated promptly to ensure they are jointly understood to minimize the risk of any unintended consequences on other services.

4.4 Consider powers, policies and procedures

- 4.4.1 Powers, policies and procedures relate to those things which may enable or constrain the action taken at an incident. Any such constraints for any particular Service should be shared with other services attending to ensure their activities are not compromised.


4.5 Identify options and contingencies

- 4.5.1 Potential course of action should be evaluated with respect to:
 - Suitability – does it fit with the strategic direction?
 - Feasibility – are sufficient resources available?
 - Acceptability – is it legal, morally defensible and justifiable?

4.6 Take action and review what happened

- 4.6.1 The steps of the Joint Decision Model all lead to the creation of an integrated multi-agency operational response plan, taking the most appropriate actions in the circumstance. It is essential that actions are monitored and the information fed back into the continuous loop to enable revisions to the risk assessment and plan as the cycle repeats.

5. Scene management



Locations to be determined by wind direction in case of HAZMAT / CBRN incidents.

5.1 Cordons

5.1.1 Cordons are established around the scene for the following reasons:

- To guard the scene;
- To protect the public;
- To control the sightseers;
- To prevent unauthorised interference with the investigation and
- To facilitate the operations of the emergency services and other agencies.

5.1.2 It should be noted that unauthorised access to the site of a major incident could jeopardise both the rescue and investigation. Access authority can be sought from the Scene Access Control point.

5.1.3 Three cordons will be established. This will be done by the police in consultation with other agencies: See diagram above – Ch 5 (Scene Management)

- Inner cordon – provides immediate security of the hazard area and potential crime scene;
- Outer cordon – seals off an extensive area around the inner cordon; and
- Traffic cordon – set up at or beyond the outer cordon to prevent unauthorised vehicle and cyclist access to the area surrounding the scene.

5.1.4 In terrorist or suspected terrorist incidents it is a criminal offence to contravene a prohibition or restriction imposed under the Terrorism Act 2000. This includes the crossing of a police cordon.

5.1.5 For all known or suspected terrorist incidents all personnel should be aware of the possibility of secondary devices. Police will be responsible for checking rendezvous points (RVPs), marshalling areas, forward command point and cordon points for suspicious objects.

5.2 Inner cordon

5.2.1 Police will control all access and exit to the inner cordon through a Cordon Control Point. This will be managed by Bronze Cordons.

5.2.2 London Fire Brigade (LFB) is responsible for safety management of all personnel within the inner cordon. At terrorist incidents the MPS Counter Terrorism Command scene manager must also be consulted on safety issues.

5.2.3 When cordons are set, persons who do not have a role, or who are wearing inappropriate clothing will be directed to leave the cordon.

5.2.4 To aid with identification of personnel authorised, suitably clothed and briefed to be in the inner cordon, the LFB inner cordon controllers and inner cordon recorders will record all personnel already in or entering the inner cordon.

5.2.5 The Police and London Ambulance Service (LAS), working in conjunction with the LFB, will also log and verify their own service personnel entering the inner cordon. In addition, the police will log representatives from the utilities, transport operators and other investigators.

5.2.6 The LFB has an emergency evacuation signal which all personnel working in the inner cordon must be aware of and respond to if the area becomes hazardous. The LFB officer will blow repeated short, sharp blasts on a whistle and declare a safe point to withdraw to.

5.2.7 Non-emergency service personnel providing assistance in the inner cordon will be directed to the appropriate command vehicle prior to going to the inner cordon.

5.3 Outer cordon

- 5.3.1 Police will control all access and exit points to the outer cordon. Non-emergency service personnel requiring access through the outer cordon will be vetted at the Scene Access Control Centre (see below) prior to attending the access point. It does not give access to the inner cordon.
- 5.3.2 The command/control vehicles of the emergency services should be positioned between the inner and outer cordons as will the RVP and marshalling area (see below).

5.4 Traffic cordon

- 5.4.1 The traffic cordon is established to restrict vehicle and cycle access to the area surrounding the scene.
- 5.4.2 Immediate action must be taken to ensure the free passage of emergency traffic to and from the scene of the incident and to prevent congestion at and around the scene.
- 5.4.3 All emergency, specialist and voluntary services attending the scene will be directed as follows. Emergency services to the RVP initially, specialist and voluntary services to the Scene Access Control Centre for vetting prior to direction to the RVP.

5.5 Logistical Support

- 5.5.1 The level of response to a major incident will be dependent on the nature, size and potential duration of the incident. Allocation and commitment of resources from responding agencies will therefore be scalable, depending on requirements. As such arrangements for logistical support and resources management will vary accordingly
- 5.5.2 Whilst it is recognised that the location of initial rendezvous points and marshalling areas will be agreed following consultation between multi-agency on-scene commanders. The location of Multi-agency Marshalling Areas and Multi-agency Holding Areas (as defined below) will only be determined following consultation between multi-agency strategic or tactical commanders.
- 5.5.3 The following generic definitions describe areas/locations used to support logistical/resource management at major incidents.

5.6 Rendezvous point (RVP)

- 5.6.1 A point to which in the first instance all emergency and specialist services may be directed prior to deployment to the scene of operations or to a designated marshalling area.
- 5.6.2 This will normally be established within the outer cordon and will be under the control of a police officer wearing the appropriate reflective tabard.
- 5.6.3 Emergency services will advise the appropriate command vehicle of resources arriving. Any not immediately required will be directed to the marshalling area.
- 5.6.4 It must be noted that the RVP plaque displayed at London Underground stations is for the use of London Underground and LFB staff only. Whilst this location might be suitable for an initial meeting point for responding services it is not an RVP for the purposes set out above and careful consideration has to be given to the safety of pre-determined locations.

5.7 Marshalling area

- 5.7.1 A marshalling area, controlled by Police, assisted by Fire Service personnel should be established between the RVP and the scene. Staff will wear appropriate reflective tabards. The actual location will be agreed after consultation between Emergency Service Tactical Commanders. The LAS will require a significant marshalling area due to the types of vehicles and numbers of resources likely to be in attendance.

- 5.7.2 This area is for resources not immediately required at the scene or which, having served their purpose, are being held for future use. It should, therefore, be an area suitable for accommodating large numbers of vehicles.
- 5.7.3 Marshalling areas may also be used to provide briefing/debriefing areas and recuperation for personnel involved in arduous work at the scene.
- 5.7.4 As the event is scaled down, the utilities and other contractors may need to maintain the marshalling area for the duration of the recovery phase.

5.8 Multi-Agency Marshalling Area (MAMA)

- 5.8.1 Where the size and nature of an incident is far greater than a conventional major incident, a multi-agency marshalling area may be required to accommodate the significant level of resources and logistical support required to sustain operations at the incident. This may include feeding, rest and recuperation, first aid, occupational health, equipment storage and service.
- 5.8.2 Multi-agency Marshalling Areas will only be established following consultation at the strategic level.

5.9 Multi-Agency Holding Area (MAHA)

- 5.9.1 The nature and duration of an incident may also require the establishment of a holding area to reserve additional resources (primarily emergency service) prior to deployment directly to the scene of operations, to a designated MAMA or to support service provision to areas not directly effected by the incident. A MAHA should be an area suitable for accommodating large numbers of vehicles and should provide additional facilities including feeding/welfare, co-ordination, administration and briefing.
- 5.9.2 Multi-agency Holding Areas will only be established following consultation at the strategic level.

5.10 Forward Command Point (FCP)

- 5.10.1 The LFB, Police and LAS control/command vehicles will form the focus from which the major incident will be managed. These vehicles, together with those of the public utilities, Local Authority and transport providers, will be located close to one another and be known collectively as the Forward Command Point (FCP). Tactical Commanders will jointly exercise their authority from this point in a coordinated manner.
- 5.10.2 The importance of this joint control function should not be underestimated. The experience of previous major incidents has demonstrated the benefits derived from the establishment of close contact between the emergency services and other agencies involved in the management of the incident.
- 5.10.3 The Forward Command Point (FCP) was previously referred to as the Joint Emergency Services Control Centre (JESCC).

5.11 Siting of vehicles

- 5.11.1 The officer in charge of the first command/control vehicle on scene should make allowance for the siting of other emergency service vehicles.
- 5.11.2 The site should:
- have enough space to accommodate all anticipated agency controls;
 - be away from the hazards of the scene, but close enough to maintain control over it; and
 - be chosen carefully as relocation may prove extremely difficult.

- 5.11.3 Ideally the site would be served with good access, lighting and toilets. Realistically this will be unusual in operational terms. A wide thoroughfare or surface car park may be used as the FCP in the absence of more suitable accommodation.
- 5.11.4 The advice of the LFB on matters of fire safety will be sought by the other emergency services in connection with the placement of the FCP. This advice may well be changed if the incident subsequently proves to involve chemicals or other hazardous materials. The choice of site would then be influenced by wind direction, strength and gradients. In this event, the LFB scientific advisor (and if available on site, safety personnel) will advise on the most suitable location for the FCP. The LFB Command Support System (CSS) is available on Command Support Units and may be used to determine a suitable site.
- 5.11.5 The Police Tactical Commander will, having consulted with the other emergency services, be responsible for confirming or amending the siting of the command/control vehicles and will establish liaison between them.
- 5.11.6 If a service mobilises more than one control/command vehicle to the scene, only one of these will perform the control function at the FCP.
- 5.11.7 To aid identification, the blue, red or green or orange identifying lights on each of the main control vehicles of the emergency services will be switched on. The identifying lights on all other vehicles must be switched off, except during incidents on open motorways or elsewhere where they are necessary to avoid accidents.
- 5.11.8 The LFB command units carry a field telephone system called Matel. This can be set up as a hard wired link between command and control vehicles. Command and control vehicles should be set up so that effective liaison and coordination can take place. Vehicles should be positioned 10 meters apart to prevent interference of communication systems.

5.12 Scene Access Control

- 5.12.1 A Scene Access Control Centre must be established outside the outer cordon, if possible in an area adjacent to the RVP. The centre, which will be under police command, must be clearly identifiable to those wishing to gain entry through the outer cordon. If necessary, an approach route must be established and signposted.
- 5.12.2 The Scene Access Control (SAC) will be responsible for checking the authenticity of non-emergency service personnel whose presence is required within the outer cordon and beyond. Such persons should be directed to the SAC in the first instance by the authority requesting their attendance.
- 5.12.3 The SAC must maintain a record of all persons who have been directed to them in order to gain access and will need to establish a link with the FCP for this purpose at an early stage. If possible, the SAC will establish communication links with the FCP by utilising available resources.
- 5.12.4 Once satisfied as to their credentials the SAC staff will where appropriate escort them to the RVP.
- 5.12.5 It must be emphasised that the role of the SAC is to facilitate entry through the outer cordon by non-emergency service personnel, whose presence is required. It does not replace the arrangements in place in relation to control of and entry to the inner cordon.

6. Command and Control

6.1 Initial control

- 6.1.1 It is possible that early on in the incident members of one service will spontaneously carry out tasks normally the responsibility of another. As soon as sufficient staff arrive, each service can be expected to establish unequivocal command and control of functions for which it is normally responsible.
- 6.1.2 It should be understood that the titles do not convey seniority of service or rank, but depict the function carried out by that particular person. From the outset it is important that commanders at every level liaise with each other to establish effective multi agency response.

6.2 Levels of Command

- 6.2.1 Operational (Bronze), Tactical (Silver) and Strategic (Gold) are tiers of command used by each emergency service (and some other organisations).
- 6.2.2 By using this universal structure, the emergency services and other responders will be able to communicate with each other and understand each other's functions and authority.

6.3 Operational (Bronze)

- 6.3.1 Operational Commanders control and deploy the resources of their respective service within a geographical or functional area, to implement the tactics formulated by their Tactical Commander. They should make every effort to achieve the closest coordination with counterparts in other Services by meeting face-to-face regularly and sharing information at the earliest opportunity.
- 6.3.2 As the incident progresses and more resources attend the scene, the level of supervision may increase proportionally.
- 6.3.3 Senior officers arriving at their respective command/control vehicles are to establish contact with their incident commanders and should also make contact with the Police Tactical Commander in order to notify any transfer of command.
- 6.3.4 It is important that Operational Commanders are easily identifiable and should wear appropriate tabards for their role.

6.4 Tactical (Silver)

- 6.4.1 Tactical Commanders are responsible for formulating the tactics to be adopted by their service to achieve the strategy set by their strategic commander. They should make every effort to achieve the closest coordination with counterparts in other Services by meeting face-to-face regularly and sharing information at the earliest opportunity.

Tactical Commanders should be located where they can most effectively undertake their responsibilities, and should remain detached from the immediate response activities. There will be occasions when tactical coordination is best achieved remotely from the scene, such as in multiple simultaneous incidents or where a command structure is already in place for a pre-planned event / operation e.g. a major incident during a sporting event.

6.5 Strategic (Gold)

- 6.5.1 A Strategic Commander for each organisation is responsible for formulating the strategy for their organisation's role in the incident. The Strategic Commander retains overall command of their resources but delegates tactical decision making to their Tactical Commander.
- 6.5.2 The recorded strategy and rationale should be continually monitored and subject to ongoing review.

6.6 Inter-agency resources

- 6.6.1 Any service may request the temporary assistance of personnel and equipment of another. In these circumstances, while the supporting service will relinquish the immediate control of those resources to the other service for the duration of the task, it will nevertheless keep overall command of its personnel and equipment at all times.
- 6.6.2 Personnel from one service who help another in this way should only be given tasks for which they are trained and not simply supplement the other service in a potentially dangerous situation. For instance, police officers may be directed to become stretcher-bearers to release fire fighters for rescue work. They should not undertake hazardous rescue work themselves.

7. Coordinating groups

7.1 General

- 7.1.1 Coordination groups at all levels of command have been of great value at all major incidents. Any delay in establishing these structures should be minimised.
- 7.1.2 It is essential that the first supervising officers on scene from each of the emergency services liaise closely with each other at the earliest opportunity.
- 7.1.3 These officers may be invited to the first Tactical coordination meeting to describe their initial decisions or they will brief their representative on the group before the meeting.
- 7.1.4 Numbers should be kept to a minimum (one from each service) to ensure meetings are not unduly long.
- 7.1.5 At Tactical or Strategic coordination meetings, attendees should have sufficient authority to guarantee that the facilities they offer on behalf of their service will be delivered.
- 7.1.6 Minutes of Tactical or Strategic meetings should be recorded, particularly key decisions taken (with rationale). These provide an *aide-mémoire* of the development of the operation and may be called at subsequent legal proceedings.
- 7.1.7 For the same reasons, attendees should record personally, notes of meetings, particularly key decisions taken (with rationale) and will be invaluable if the writer is called as a witness to formal inquest, inquiry or criminal trial.

7.2 Strategic Coordinating Group

- 7.2.1 A Strategic Coordinating Group may initially comprise of only representatives of the blue light emergency services, local authorities and London Resilience Team. Additional Strategic-level representation from wider agencies will depend on the nature of the incident. Some Major Incidents may be so quickly resolved that there is no requirement to convene a Strategic Coordinating Group.
- 7.2.2 Where the size and nature of the incident is far greater than a conventional major incident, it may be appropriate to convene immediate and full strategic representation from the London resilience partnership (the regional tier). This would be considered appropriate where, from the outset, it is apparent that there is the requirement for prolonged and significant input from all partner agencies. This level of strategic coordination will be accommodated through the opening of a Strategic Coordination Centre (see [Strategic Coordination Protocol](#) for further information).

7.2.3 Representatives

Organisation	Representatives
Police	Police Strategic Commander (see 6.3.1) Administrative support / minute taker Senior Identification Manager (SIM)/Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) Safety Advisor Press Advisor
Fire	Fire Strategic Commander
Ambulance	Ambulance Strategic Commander
Local Authorities	London Local Authority Gold (or deputy)
London Resilience Team	Duty Officer
Transport for London	TfL Liaison Officer

7.2.4 Location of meetings

The Strategic Coordinating Group will normally meet at a location remote from the scene with suitable communications and meeting facilities, but may also be held by teleconference.

7.2.5 Frequency of meetings

The nature of the incident will govern the frequency of Strategic Coordinating Group meetings.

7.2.6 Tasks

At the first meeting, the Strategic Coordinating Group will determine the strategic issues relevant to the incident, including the obligation to warn and inform the public, and maintain an overview. They will ensure sufficient support and resources are available at the incident. In addition, the group may provide liaison with central government and other bodies.

A template agenda for the Strategic Coordinating Group is available in the [Strategic Coordination Protocol](#).

Coupled with this will be visits made by VIPs to the scene and to injured survivors. These visits place additional strain on the operation in terms of security, public order, increased media attention and interruption to normal rescue functions. Police Strategic Commander will be responsible for planning and liaison relating to these visits.

7.3 Tactical Coordinating Group

7.3.1 Representatives

Organisation	Representatives
Police (chair)	Police Tactical Commander Senior Identification Manager/Senior Investigating Officer Minute Taker Safety Advisor Press Advisor
Fire	Fire Tactical Commander Inter-agency Liaison Officer (ILO) Scientific Advisory (as needed) Press Advisor
Ambulance	Ambulance Tactical Commander Medical Incident Officer (MIO) Press Advisor Emergency Planning Officer or CBRN Tactical Support Officer
Local Authorities	Local Authority Liaison Officer Technical Officers as requested
Transport for London	TfL On Site Silver Manager Technical Officers as requested
Other	It may be beneficial to have specialist advisors attend Tactical coordination meetings dependent on the nature of the incident and industry affected. Individuals are available from industry who may be able to make important contributions to aid a coordinated and effective response to the incident and to the tactical decision-making process.

7.3.2 Location of meetings

The tactical coordination meeting should initially meet close to the scene; it may be moved to premises which are better served, although further from the scene, as operations progress.

7.3.3 Frequency of meetings

The police tactical commander will convene a tactical coordination meeting at the earliest opportunity. Subsequent meetings should be scheduled. Additional meetings may be called by the police incident officer at the request of another member of the group.

7.3.4 Recording meetings

Minutes of the Tactical coordination meetings should be recorded by police with key decisions explained.

Example Agenda:

1) METHANE update

2) Brief update from each organization:

- **Significant Issues**
- **Immediate Tasks/Objectives to be achieved and progress**
- **Control measures**

3) Horizon scan - What is coming up, likely to happen, needed for the future

4) Agree a plan

5) Comms issues?

6) Next meeting time

Joint Emergency Services Channel invoked (via MetCC)?

7.3.5 Safety

The LFB will provide professional advice on matters of safety at incidents involving fire or rescue. However, overall responsibility for health and safety rests with each organisation. Consideration should also be given to utilising the expertise that may be available from industries directly involved in the disaster. The Health and Safety Executive is also able to advise on safety matters.

7.3.6 Warning and informing

The Civil Contingencies Act requires category 1 responders to warn and inform the public of emergencies and possible actions they may take to minimise the impact.

Accurate and up to date information is essential. A variety of methods may be used to provide information to the public:

- TV and radio
- internet and "new" media
- local broadcast by emergency services P.A. system
- door to door communication

Incidents involving hazardous materials or fumes will require a dynamic assessment of information and timely dissemination to the public.

8. Communications systems

8.1 General

- 8.1.1 The emergency services and many other agencies, including coastguard, many London Boroughs, etc., have introduced TETRA based radios with joint communications interoperability. These agencies are able to use common talkgroups to communicate whilst still maintaining the integrity of their own individual talkgroups. Access to talkgroups is not shared between different organizations, e.g. LAS do not have MPS operational talkgroups. However, COLP, BTP and TfL have shared a number of talkgroups. There are several categories of shared communications talkgroups, such as Emergency Services (ES), Inter-Agency Talkgroups (IAT), Multi-Agency Mutual Aid (MAMA) and others.

8.2 Operational Communications Security

Airwave is a digitally encrypted radio system that has a very high level of security. It cannot be decrypted by mass-market scanners and to date there is no known incident of an Airwave transmission having been intercepted and decrypted. To all intents and purposes it is a secure network. However, scanners to intercept fax mobile telephony or unencrypted radio transmissions on other systems may well be used to intercept information transmitted between the services and agencies. This should be borne in mind when wording any transmission, including cellular telephone conversations, which may contain sensitive information.

8.3 Terrorism Incidents

At known or suspected terrorist incidents radios should be kept on but placed in "Transmission Inhibit" (TXI) mode - this includes both personal radios and vehicle radios. This will prevent accidental voice transmission and also prevent the radio from carrying out its normal background function of searching for other transmitter sites and stronger signals.

When a suspect explosive device has been located personnel should withdraw to a safe distance of at least 15 metres from the device before transmitting on personal radios. This distance should be increased to 50 metres when vehicle-based radios are used.

It should be borne in mind that GSM digital telephones and some trunked radio systems permanently transmit as part of their normal operating procedure. When a device is discovered these items should be disconnected and not activated until they are outside the 50-metre zone mentioned above.

8.4 City of London Police (COLP)

The COLP force control has all the computer hardware common to many computer aided dispatch systems found in all the service headquarters. This is assisted by the monitoring of events on strategically placed cameras within central London and relayed on screens within the control room.

8.5 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

- 8.5.1 The MPS Met Communications Command (MetCC) is based at three locations. MetCC has the ability to communicate with Borough Grip and Pace centres, MPS vehicles and foot patrol officers. The MPS computer aided dispatch system is compatible with that of the City of London Police, is available to BTP, and has an incident passing capability to LAS. Communication with the LFB is by telephone. MetCC has can receive video coverage from most of the inner London traffic network; the MPS can also receive images from each of the local authority CCTV systems. The National Police Air Service helicopter can provide live and recorded video of an incident anywhere in London which may be downloaded if required.

- 8.5.2 In the MPS Airwave radio is fitted to vehicles and issued to individual officers. Different talkgroups are used for local borough operational command units and pan London units, but all can communicate with each other if required. All radios have a standard set of talkgroups, which includes all Borough talkgroups, other Police force interoperable talkgroups and talkgroups shared with other agencies, whilst specialist or other departments have additional talkgroups relative to their own

needs. Local Borough operational talkgroups including Dispatch, Support and selected Pan London talkgroups are operational on the Underground network. MPS Airwave radios have the facility to provide cross-agency interoperability.

8.6 British Transport Police (BTP)

8.6.1 The BTP has two control rooms: Force Control Room London (FCR L) and Force Control Room Birmingham (FCR B). The BTP has its own Command and Control system (NSPIS C&C); in addition FCR L has direct access to MPS CAD and is CAD-live. There is a limited CCTV capacity available within both FCR L and FCR B.

BTP uses Airwave, the TETRA –based radio system throughout the country, which also extends onto the London Underground system.

The Duty Officer in both FCRL and FCRB has details of the callout procedures (via MPS) for the ERVs (Emergency Response Vehicles) should additional Airwave capacity be required in the event of an emergency underground. This capability and procedure for deploying this capability is known as 'Operational Tunnel Sound'.

Two incident command vehicles are available in the London area and additional command and control capacity can be brought in from outside London if required.

8.7 London Fire Brigade (LFB)

8.7.1 All front line appliances are equipped with fixed Tetra digital radios. These are primarily used for communication between appliances and LFB control. They also provide facilities to talk to neighbouring Fire and Rescue Services and access to some of the Interagency Talk groups (IATs). Operational middle managers and above are provided with handheld Tetra radios providing the same facilities. Specialist officers have access to additional talk groups relative to their role.

8.7.2 All LFB operational staff are issued with incident ground radios that operate on UHF. They are compatible with 'leaky feeder' systems installed in London Underground stations and other designated sub surface locations. A limited number of additional hand sets are available on the LFB command units which may be made available to other agencies dependent on the circumstances.

8.7.3 Most front line appliances are fitted with Mobile Data Terminals (MDT). The MDT provides operational information to crews. This includes mobilising information, premises risk information, tactical plans, water supplies and hazardous substance information.

8.7.4 The LFB command units have the following communication facilities;

- A computer based incident Command Support System (CSS)
- A range of ITC equipment which is data enabled for communication
- Cellular phones
- Cellular fax facility
- Helicopter down link from the MPS
- Mobile repeaters and spare 'leaky feeder' cable for UHF radios where radio reception is poor or fixed systems have failed
- 'Matel' field telephone (a portable hard wired telephone system), this can be used for a communication network between emergency services command vehicles

8.7.5 All major incidents and incidents of note are monitored in the Brigade Coordination Centre (BCC). The BCC provides command and logistical support to these incidents remotely.

8.8 London Ambulance Service (LAS)

8.8.1 LAS emergency ambulances, response cars and other vehicles are fitted with TETRA radios, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and an Automatic Vehicle Location System (AVLS) through mobile data terminals on each vehicle.

8.8.2 The duty officer vehicles are fitted with cell phones and Tetra radios for use by LAS officers at the scene.

- 8.8.3 The LAS have control vehicles that may attend the scene of an incident if required. Due to the TETRA system used by the LAS, control vehicles may not be deployed in the first instance. The facility for more talk groups to be used allow staff not to be dependent upon control vehicles as the main point of communications at an incident site and they will be able to talk directly to the Incident Control Room. They also have the facility to link into British Telecom phone lines. A mobile telephone and fax machine are also fitted to each control vehicle.
- 8.8.4 LAS Incident Control is the control room situated within the EOC complex for use during serious and Major Incidents. It is responsible for controlling the incident, communication with hospitals, primary logging duties, paging instruction procedures and the strategic overview of the incident.

8.9 MPS Special Operations Room (MP-SOR)

- 8.9.1 The Special Operations Room (SOR call sign 'GT') has provided command and control for numerous major incidents that have occurred in London within recent years. It is part of the MetCC Operational Command Unit.
- 8.9.2 SOR (GT) provides command and control for major incidents, terrorist incidents, disorder and demonstrations. The room has consoles that are set-aside for the LAS, LFB, BTP, COLP and additional agencies (e.g. local authorities, armed forces). It is from here that the various service liaison officers work, they have access to all the radio and CAD communications channeled through the room and can, for example, relay requests for assistance to their own control rooms.
- 8.9.3 SOR (GT) does not control the incident. Its function is to provide a support structure to the Incident Command, to assist in the management of the incident. It cannot be over-emphasised that the best operational communications will always be conducted verbally between service representatives on site.
- 8.9.4 Within MetCC there are also facilities for communicating with all other police forces in the United Kingdom, members of Interpol and central government.

8.10 Inter-agency command

- 8.10.1 LAS and LFB command vehicles that attend the scene are each equipped with Tetra (Airwave) radio.
- 8.10.2 All services are able to communicate on Airwave interoperability talkgroups that are common to all emergency services. These are the ES talkgroups which are found in each force-specific folder in both handheld and control room radio terminals. Talkgroup IC1 is used by Tactical Commanders, whilst the ES talkgroups are for Operational Commanders. In addition there is an inter-agency talkgroup - IAT1 - which is available to all Airwave users as well as a number of police and multi-agency mutual aid talkgroups.

IC 1 for Tactical and ES 1-3 for Operational

These radios are intended for command use only by the respective service for liaison purposes or to pass critical information in a life-threatening situation and not for general inter-service use. Their use needs to be specifically requested by Tactical Commanders through MetCC utilising **Operation Cavern**.

8.11 Liaison officers

- 8.11.1 Each agency will on request provide liaison officers to the Strategic Coordinating Group.
- 8.11.2 In addition, the LFB has a cadre of dedicated trained and qualified inter-agency liaison officers (ILOs), who can advise and support incident commanders, police, medical, military and other government agencies on the LFB's operational capacity and capability to reduce risk and safely resolve incidents at which a brigade attendance may be required. The LAS have a similar system, with a group of Emergency Planning Managers (EPMs) and CBRN Tactical Support Officers (TSOs) who can provide advice and support to the Ambulance Incident Officers and others on matters relating to emergency planning and other ambulance service or NHS requirements.

8.12 Local Authority communications

- 8.12.1 Many local authorities have their own integral radio communications systems; however, these may not be compatible between boroughs or with the emergency services. All London Local Authorities have procured Tetra (Airwave) radios and are on at least one talkgroup which enables them to communicate with all other London boroughs. (A number of boroughs have signed a LA/MPS Protocol to enable local authorities to use the MPS SRL talkgroups). All local authorities have emergency satellite phones.

8.13 Telecom assistance

- 8.13.1 Telecommunication utility companies have a range of alternative communication systems for use by the emergency services. Charges may be incurred.

8.14 MTPAS Mobile Telephony Priority Access Scheme

- 8.14.1 This is the authorised scheme whereby the mobile telephony service providers can, in the event of a major incident, limit access to their respective networks and permit emergency services, local authorities and other users with suitably enabled mobile telephones to have exclusive access to available channels.
- 8.14.2 This facility is expensive to implement and can cause inconvenience to other responders, such as Transport for London. It should only be initiated after careful consideration and on the authority of Police Gold. In an extreme or urgent situation a Police Tactical Commander may request the implementation of MTPAS.
- 8.14.3 The system works by using MTPAS -enabled SIM cards. The SIM cards are supplied by the respective service providers. Individual emergency service organisations should consult their own policy in relation to the numbers of MTPAS -enabled telephones they can obtain. As a guide each organisation should take into consideration key posts to be supplied with MTPAS -enabled SIM cards.
- 8.14.4 It should be noted that the Cabinet Office is the authorising body for MTPAS registration and the number allowed on the scheme is strictly limited to preserve its operational benefits.

8.15 Radio Amateurs' Emergency Network (RAYNET)

- 8.15.1 RAYNET is a nationwide voluntary group of United Kingdom government-licensed radio operators who are able to provide emergency radio communications to the emergency services, local authorities and central government departments. Their radio communications equipment is specifically designated for use in emergencies.
- 8.15.2 Greater London RAYNET can provide specialist VHF/UHF radio communications assistance across London and beyond into neighbouring counties. National and international radio communications can also be provided if requested.
- 8.15.3 The assistance of RAYNET should be sought from the appropriate service control.

9. Casualty clearance

9.1 Categories

- 9.1.1 The care and identification of casualties is a primary responsibility of the emergency services at a major incident. Victims fall into one of four categories:
- Survivors (uninjured);
 - Casualties (injured);
 - Evacuees; or
 - Dead
- 9.1.2 They may be witnesses/victims or even suspects and carry evidence or hazards on their clothing, particularly in terrorist incidents.

9.2 Uninjured

- 9.2.1 The uninjured will have been involved in the incident, but will not necessarily want or require medical attention. They will usually be removed from the hazard or hazard zone by London Fire Brigade personnel. Once these people have been removed from any hazards, processed through a triage sieve by the LAS they must be handed over to the Police for collation of details and witness statements.
- 9.2.2 They will all be potential witnesses, Police will need to collate their details for the benefit of the casualty bureau as well as the investigation. This can be done at suitable premises nearby, called the Survivor Reception Centre.(See 9.7)

9.3 Casualties (Injured)

- 9.3.1 The injured need to be rescued from the scene and cared for as quickly and safely as possible by the rescuers, who must be mindful of the requirement of the ambulance and medical teams on site. Ambulance paramedics and technicians then need to be able to administer the appropriate pre-hospital treatment before the patients are taken to the receiving hospitals. As the ambulance teams go forward they will take equipment for use by emergency responders at the incident site.
- 9.3.2 The LAS aim at any multiple casualty incident is to produce the largest number of survivors. They will need to deliver the right patient to the right place at the right time so that they receive the optimum treatment. Triage is a dynamic continuous process. The LAS have a responsibility to ensure that at every stage of the incident patients are continually assessed to ensure that changes in the condition of the patient are reflected in the patient's triage category.
- 9.3.3 The triage system is a "physiological system" which relies on changes in vital signs as a result of an injury or illness rather than an "anatomical system" that relies on decisions being made on what injuries can be seen. Where an experienced clinician is using the triage system, knowledge of the clinical condition that is based on an anatomical injury may be used to upgrade a triage category.
- 9.3.4 During an incident the LAS will use two levels of triage: "Triage sieve" and "Triage sort". Both systems use algorithms to determine which priority group a patient falls into. The priority groups are as follows:

Priority Description Colour

1. Red Priority 1
2. Yellow Priority 2
3. Green Priority 3
4. Red 1 with fold down Blue Corner
5. White with the wording 'Dead'

9.3.5 Triage sieve

This triage sieve quickly sorts out casualties into priority groups. Using the algorithm card the LAS will systematically work through the patients, triaging and labeling them. The LAS will not get involved in substantive patient treatment during a triage sieve this will include the looking for any signs of life.

9.3.6 Triage sort

On the arrival of further resources patients are moved to a place of safety, usually the casualty clearing station. At this location they can be re-triaged using a triage sort process. This process is a more thorough clinical triage than the sieve.

9.3.7 The same triage card is used throughout the sieve and sort process updating patients triage category by refolding the card as necessary.

9.3.8 Paediatric triage

During most major incidents the LAS triage paediatrics using the adult triage sieve – this over-prioritises but is a safe option. During a multiple casualty incident involving mainly paediatric patients the LAS will instigate the use of the paediatric triage process. The system uses similar algorithms to that of the adult triage tape.

9.3.9 Expectant category

The expectant category is only used with the authority of the LAS Strategic Commander in liaison with the Medical Director, and with advice from the Emergency Planning Advisor. This situation would arise when there are such large numbers of patients the ability of the LAS to respond to the clinical needs of every individual and potentially unsurvivable injuries would be to the detriment of other patients.

9.3.10 Expectant patients must be triaged labelled as “priority 1” which is red in colour though with a blue flash corner folded back from the rear of the priority 1 card.

9.3.11 The decision to what casualties fall into the category would be decided by an appropriate doctor.

9.3.12 Casualty clearing station and ambulance loading point

The casualty clearing station is a place of relative safety to which casualties are conveyed from the incident site. Triage sort, assessment, treatment and stabilisation is carried out by LAS staff together with any mobile medical teams on scene at the station. The casualty clearing station is coordinated by the LAS Bronze Clearing officer and a doctor (Casualty Clearing Station Medical Lead).

9.3.13 A suitable area or building between the inner and outer cordons near to the site should be identified for use as the casualty clearing station, or a temporary structure may be assembled.

9.3.14 Once enough resources have arrived on scene it is vital that patient documentation starts within the casualty clearing station.

9.3.15 Hospital

Once the patient arrives at the hospital the patient will be re-triaged by hospital staff. The ambulance crew must ensure that they report their arrival with both EOC and the Ambulance Liaison Officer (ALO) at the hospital.

9.3.16 Labeling and documentation

Documentation of patients must start as soon as possible. Triage labels must be attached to patients in the initial stages of the incident even if there is no opportunity to collect personal details. Details of each patient should be collected as soon as they enter the casualty clearing station/area.

9.3.17 It may not always be possible for Ambulance Crews to record the usual details of patients carried on patient report forms however on route to the hospital any details about the patient that can be

obtained will be entered onto the patient report form (PRF) so that a record of patient movement and patient care (however minimal) is recorded. Ambulances should not be delayed at the scene in order to obtain personal details of individual casualties, which will be obtained by the police at the Receiving Hospitals. In all circumstances the triage label must be completed.

- 9.3.18 Police service instructions refer to the attaching of nationally and recommended identification labels to deceased persons. Ambulance service personnel should note that these identity and evidential labels are NOT to be used in place of the medical triage labels.
- 9.3.19 Police should liaise with the LAS to maintain a count of all persons processed with details of hospitals to which they have been taken.
- 9.3.20 Police officers will be deployed to the casualty departments of these hospitals to provide documentation teams, assist with forensic issues and security advice.

9.4 Deceased and Human Remains

The LAS/LAA will assess and pronounce life extinct as required, these patients will then be appropriately triage tagged and left in situ to ensure continuity of the forensic process. More information about managing mass fatalities is available in the [London Resilience Mass Fatalities Framework](#).

9.4.1 The Coroner

Her Majesty's Coroner is responsible for establishing who has died, how, when and where they died. Where multiple deaths occur, the police will investigate and report to HM Coroner, this is in addition to police responsibilities regarding any criminal investigation. There are eight Coronial districts within the Greater London area; these are made up of clusters of London Boroughs with the exception of the City of London which stands alone. Jurisdiction will normally sit with the coronial district "where the body lies."

Jurisdiction may, by agreement, be transferred between coroners in some circumstances. For a large incident that affects more than one coronial district it may be agreed to appoint a Lead Coroner. This would require agreement between the coroners concerned as well as funding support from the London Boroughs concerned.

It is important that HM Coroner's Office is consulted and included in the decision making around the response to an incident involving fatalities. HM Coroner may want to assess the disaster scene along with other nominated persons such as a Pathologist.

9.4.2 Police Senior Identification Manager

Police commanders will appoint a senior investigator as the "Senior Identification Manager," this manager will hold a nationally recognised qualification in management of the investigation regarding Disaster Victim Identification (DVI). The Senior Identification Manager will liaise with HM Coroner and be responsible for Disaster Victim Identification investigation at the scene; investigation within the mortuary; investigation at Casualty Bureau and Family Liaison investigation. The Senior Identification Manager will work closely with the Senior Investigating Officer appointed to manage any criminal investigation.

9.4.3 Scene Investigation

Police commanders will deploy a suitably skilled Disaster Scene Coordinator to coordinate Disaster Victim Recovery, Forensic, Search and other related investigative activity at the disaster scene. The title Scene Evidence Recovery Manager is used in existing national guidance. Bomb Scene Manager is a title used in counter terrorism. The Disaster Scene Coordinator will be a police manager who has the required knowledge to safely manage specialist activity and the ability to work closely with other agencies. Other agencies would include the London Fire Brigade and statutory investigative bodies such as the Health and Safety Executive and Rail, Marine or Air Accident Investigation Branch.

9.4.4 Mortuaries

If local arrangements are insufficient to cope with the amount of deceased victims, emergency arrangements must be activated. Some of the larger public mortuaries in London have been identified as Designated Disaster Mortuaries. These mortuaries can be enhanced or adapted to cope with an increased amount of deceased victims and the associated investigative activity.

Temporary structures may be used to enhance existing mortuaries or to build a stand-alone temporary mortuary. A temporary mortuary may be utilised for storage or, if assessed as necessary, be capable of hosting investigative post mortem autopsy examinations. If the disaster is significant, government assistance may be required to utilise National Emergency Mortuary Arrangements (NEMA). Sites where a large temporary mortuary could be constructed have been identified and are regularly reviewed.

9.4.5 Disaster Victim Identification

London has a cadre of police officers and forensic practitioners who have received additional training in Disaster Victim Identification (DVI). London contributes to a national DVI cadre coordinated by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO – UK DVI). Mutual aid can be provided to London through the UK DVI Coordinator, based within the Police National Information Coordination Centre (PNICC).

Personnel are trained in Disaster Victim Recovery, using the Disaster Victim Recovery Booklet to assign a unique number to the deceased victim or to a body part recovered. The booklet also records initial evidence such as the location that the deceased victim was found; forensic issues; whether the body appears to be complete; plus relevant times for continuity. Disaster Victim Recovery Booklets are held by Metropolitan, City of London and British Transport Police. An emergency online version is also available to download from the INTERPOL website. Disaster Victim Recovery operations may require support from London Fire Brigade, with regard to safety and specialist equipment to aid access to deceased victims.

The DVI cadre are also trained in mortuary procedures to recover Post Mortem Data and exhibits. Mortuary investigation involves the use of the INTERPOL DVI Post Mortem Forms which are also available via the INTERPOL website. These forms which should always be printed on pink paper are used to record Post Mortem Data such as physical features; clothing and jewellery etc.

A Police Mortuary Operations Coordinator will be appointed to manage police investigative activity at the mortuary, working closely with the Local Authority Mortuary Manager.

There must be lines of communication from the scene and mortuary with Casualty Bureau, where details of missing persons and casualties are collated.

9.4.6 Forensic Investigation

A Home Office approved Pathologist will be appointed as a key contributor to the investigation and to provide evidence to HM Coroner regarding the cause of death. If the deaths are as a result of a criminal act or negligence a Forensic Pathologist will be appointed. Sections of the INTERPOL DVI Post Mortem forms are specific to pathology. Pathologists will be assisted by Anatomical Pathology Technicians. Other forensic specialists that may be utilised in the mortuary are: Forensic Odontologists; Forensic Anthropologists; Police Crime Scene Managers and Fingerprint Practitioners. There are sections of the INTERPOL DVI Post Mortem Forms specific to Odontology (dental information); Fingerprints and DNA.

9.4.7 Family Liaison Investigation

Ante Mortem Data is information relating to the missing person provided by next of kin etc. This information is collected by Family Liaison Officers who have received specific training in investigation which results in the completion of the INTERPOL DVI Ante Mortem Forms, which should always be printed on yellow paper. These forms are virtually identical to the INTERPOL DVI Post Mortem Forms, with sections for clothing, jewellery, pathology, odontology, fingerprints and DNA etc.

The Family Liaison Officer may require support from forensic specialists in order to recover or check Ante Mortem Data such as dental records, fingerprints or DNA for comparison.

Family Liaison Officers are tasked by a Family Liaison Coordinator working from Casualty Bureau, where details of missing persons and casualties are collated.

9.4.8 Reconciliation Investigation

Post Mortem Data is compared to Ante Mortem Data in order to establish identification. Deceased disaster victims will normally be identified using the United Kingdom and INTERPOL Disaster Victim Identification "Primary Identification Standards." This means that where possible and subject to the approval of HM Coroner, deceased victims should be identified by comparison of dental information; DNA or fingerprints. In some circumstances a unique medical or physical feature may provide reliable evidence of identity, such as a uniquely numbered medical implant. This information should be supported by "Secondary Identifiers" such as marks, scars or tattoos, plus supporting information such as clothing, jewellery or where appropriate circumstantial evidence. The DVI cadre includes "Reconciliation Investigators" who with the support of forensic specialists will prepare a detailed report for HM Coroner regarding evidence of identity. This evidence will be presented at an inquest or a specially arranged Identification Commission chaired by HM Coroner.

9.5 Evacuees

- 9.5.1 Some emergencies may require the evacuation of a large surrounding area because of the danger to life from environmental or structural hazards. Further details can be found in the [London Mass Evacuation Framework](#). Care must be taken to ensure that evacuation does not place those concerned in greater danger.
- 9.5.2 Evacuation is usually undertaken on the advice of the Fire Tactical Commander. In some circumstances, personnel from all services may have to assist in carrying it out.
- 9.5.3 A suitable evacuation assembly point will need to be established and rest centres set up by the local authority.
- 9.5.4 Personnel from the Local Authority and voluntary agencies will staff rest centres as appropriate. The rest centres will provide security, welfare, communication, light refreshment and medical facilities.
- 9.5.5 Evacuees should be documented and basic details passed to the casualty bureau.

9.6 Rest Centre

- 9.6.1 A Rest / Reception Centre serves as a place of safety for those who have been evacuated from their home, work or other place or are unable to return to that place, but who are uninjured and not directly affected by the incident.
- 9.6.2 The selection of a suitable rest centre should always be made in conjunction with the local authority where practicable, as there may already be pre-defined facilities in the area affected.
- 9.6.3 Further details can be found in the [London Mass Shelter Framework](#)

9.7 Survivor Reception Centre

- 9.7.1 A Survivor Reception Centre is normally set up following a major incident. It can either be a pre-determined or a dynamic venue or place, depending on the location of the major incident. Its function is to provide survivors, who do not require hospital treatment, a place to be directed to, where they can be met by police and other services to obtain initial information and support in the immediate aftermath of the incident and give details to police investigating officers.
- 9.7.2 In the early stages of an incident, where those involved are leaving the scene it may not be practicable to establish an S.R.C. because of other more pressing primary responsibilities e.g. life saving or clearing the public from danger.
- 9.7.3 The responsibility for opening an SRC will lie with the Police supported by the Local Authority. Other agencies will attend as required and requested by the Police or Local Authority.

9.7.4 The LAS will provide medical support to the Survivor Reception Centre in the early stages of an incident.

9.7.5 The purpose of a Survivor Reception Centre (SRC) is:

- To Collect information relevant to the investigation;
- To provide immediate shelter for persons who have been directly involved in an emergency;
- To allow documentation of the survivors;
- To enable the interviewing of potential witnesses by the Police;
- To provide first aid to those in need of it and not requiring hospitalisation;
- To provide initial care and welfare support to survivors;
- To organise onward travel where appropriate;
- To provide information to survivors.

9.8 Friends and Relatives Reception Centre

9.8.1 Where demand warrants it consideration to establishing a secure comfortable area where friends and relatives of casualties and missing persons can be directed for information.

9.8.2 The size and scale of incident, numbers of fatalities and possibly area of destruction will impact on any decisions made. Within the area to be set aside for the friends and relatives reception centre, consideration should be given to locating the relevant agencies whose advice and assistance may be called upon.

9.8.3 There will be a need to ensure the resources of all those working towards the needs of family and friends are coordinated and that there are regular briefings to ensure a cohesive approach is established.

9.8.4 The purpose of a Friends and Relatives Reception Centre (FRRC) is:

- To help reunite friends and relatives with survivors;
- To provide a place for the Police to record missing persons enquiries and to collect information that may aid their investigation;
- To provide friends and relatives with a safe area to gather, away from media attention;
- To provide friends and relatives with up-to-date and accurate information on the response arrangements that have been put in place;
- To provide access to practical and emotional support to those friends and relatives affected.

9.9 Casualty Bureau

9.9.1 Police may establish a casualty bureau where details on all dead, casualties, survivors and evacuees will be collated. This centre will also take telephone enquiries from friends and relatives of people who are believed to be involved in the incident.

9.9.2 Casualty bureau staff will then match details of persons involved with enquiries.

9.9.3 Where a match is made appropriate contact with the enquirer will be made.

9.9.4 The casualty bureau will not close until all the casualties have been identified, all next of kin have been informed and telephone enquiries have diminished to a level where they can be dealt with by the local police area.

9.9.5 To avoid discrepancies in casualty figures all information must be routed through casualty bureau, which will be the sole source of casualty information. Casualty figures must only be released following consultation with Police Gold or their press officers.

9.9.6 Where injuries are fatal or serious, contact should be made with the family liaison officer Coordinator to discuss whether it is appropriate to appoint a family liaison officer at this stage.

9.10 Humanitarian Assistance Centre

A Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC) would be set up with the following objectives:

- Act as a focal point for humanitarian assistance to bereaved individuals and families, survivors and impacted communities;
- Enable individuals and families to gain as much information as is currently available about family members and friends involved in the incident;
- Enable the gathering of mass forensic samples in a timely manner, in order to enhance the ability to identify loved ones quickly;
- Offer access to a range of facilities that will allow individuals, families and survivors to make informed choices according to their needs;
- Provide a coherent multi-agency approach to humanitarian assistance in emergencies that will minimise duplication.

9.10.1 It is the responsibility of Local Authorities to set up and run a HAC with support from the Police and other agencies following a request from the Strategic Coordinating Group.

9.10.2 Sites have been identified across London that could be used as a HAC and site-specific plans have been produced for how these buildings would be used, in agreement with the MPS Property Services Division who would assist in carrying out the refit.

9.10.3 A HAC differs from Rest Centres or FRRCs in the respect that these are generally used in the immediate aftermath of an incident with specific purposes, for example to reunite relatives with survivors or to provide temporary shelter. The HAC should not interfere with the function of these or other initial support areas. Instead it should have a broader remit and longer-term role whilst investigation and recovery operations are taking place.

9.10.4 More details can be found in the [London Humanitarian Assistance Framework](#)

9.11 Community Assistance Centre

The Local Authority may decide to establish a Community Assistance Centre (CAC) to undertake a detailed Community Impact Assessment, to provide advice and support to affected people and to support the recovery of the community in a local setting. Community Assistance Centres may be considered particularly where a Humanitarian Assistance Centre has not been activated. It may be appropriate particularly:

- When the impact is concentrated in a particular area.
- If a number of areas are affected several such centres may be considered.
- Where people are affected significantly, and need advice and support, but the intensity of the impact is of a lower order (for example, there are not mass fatalities) and/or the number of people affected is smaller than would trigger an HAC.

A CAC should be located in an appropriate publicly accessible building within easy reach of the affected people, and should provide support services appropriate to the incident.

10. Helicopters

10.1 Police helicopters

10.1.1 The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has access to the National Police Air Service fully role equipped helicopters available 24/7 over the whole of the Greater London area.

10.1.2 Their aircraft have the following equipment:

- Comprehensive radio communications, including air traffic control (ATC) frequencies to ease communications with other emergency response aircraft and a comprehensive airwave fleetplan enabling multi agency communications
- Visual and thermal imaging equipment, effective day and night
- Some aircraft have a searchlight ('nitesun') capability to illuminate a wide area and for immediate rescue needs, effective at altitude for minimal ground disturbance
- Public address system ('skyshout') capable of broadcasting messages at a lower operating height; (Not routinely carried.)
- Video transmission equipment to ground-based receiving stations which include MPS and London Fire Brigade (LFB) command vehicles and a number of police patrol supervisor vehicles. Mobile receivers are also available which can be delivered close to the scene by the aircraft or collected from the base
- Digital stills camera

10.1.3 Helicopters can provide the following support facilities:

- airborne command and control in the immediate aftermath of an incident;
- capture of the scene and post incident activities on evidential video;
- immediate overview of scene, including the size of affected area and ancillary factors
- casualty search/assessment of numbers;
- identification of present or potential hazards;
- transportation of personnel and equipment for deployment near to the scene;
- weather conditions, including wind direction at scene;
- area containment, including cordon deployment/infringement,
- traffic management/route planning schemes
- evidential imagery of scene, including photographs, video, thermal imaging and detailed target analysis.

10.2 Military helicopters

10.2.1 RAF/RN Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopters are available to respond to civil incidents and could, for example, assist in the transfer of urgent casualties to hospitals outside London if this were necessary. These helicopters are equipped to winch survivors from the sea or river and can carry several stretcher cases. They can conduct searches visually and by using radar and infra-red equipment.

10.2.2 The nearest RAF SAR helicopter base to London is at Wattisham in Suffolk, about 40–45 minutes' reaction and flying time from central London. The presence of suitable landing sites adjacent to the incident is a prerequisite for casualty evacuation.

- 10.2.3 RAF SAR helicopters are alerted by the Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC), located at Kinloss Barracks in Scotland.
- 10.2.4 No Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA) process is required for the emergency call out of SAR helicopters.
- 10.2.5 In addition, RAF support helicopters (from RAF Odiham in Hampshire and RAF Benson, Oxfordshire) could be used for the evacuation of larger numbers of serious casualties. The use of support helicopters would be subject to MACA procedures and would depend on the availability of these helicopters.

10.3 London Air Ambulance (LAA) - Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS)

- 10.3.1 The LAS has the ability to mobilise air ambulance assistance. The decision to do so must be taken in conjunction with the other Emergency Services at the scene to ensure a coordinated approach to all local air traffic including other emergency services and/or military services. Any requests for the air ambulance should be directed to the Ambulance Tactical Commander.
- 10.3.2 Where an incident occurs which involves a very high number of casualties it may be necessary for some of them to be taken to a hospital some distance from the scene. In such cases the ambulance control will liaise with the LAA and, in certain circumstances, the military.
- 10.3.3 LAA may also be mobilised to any casualty requiring advanced trauma life support from the on-board doctor and paramedic(s).
- 10.3.4 LAA is available to land at a predetermined location and provide at least one doctor and trained paramedic to the scene. The helicopter can also be used to ferry additional doctors and resources as well as evacuate single casualties.
- 10.3.5 The LAA doctors are an integral part in the mass casualty scenario. The doctors will support even without the helicopter.

10.4 HM Coastguard search and rescue helicopters

- 10.4.1 HM Coastguard SAR helicopters may also be called upon to assist in marine or land rescue incidents in the London area. Coastguard helicopters are equipped to winch people from the water or from vessels and can carry seated and stretcher casualties. They are fitted with infrared equipment to assist location of casualties in the water in poor visibility and at night.
- 10.4.2 HM Coastguard helicopters are alerted through London Coastguard for marine incidents and by the MPS through the Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre at RAF Kinloss for land incidents.

10.5 Temporary heli-pads

- 10.5.1 Temporary heli-pads might need to be identified with consideration for:
- safety of crew and aircraft from obstructions such as wires, unit masts and unsuitable terrain;
 - safety from harmful chemical release, fire/smoke;
 - access to vehicle; and
 - disturbance of debris/evidence or disruption by excessive noise.

10.6 Emergency flying restrictions

- 10.6.1 Police have the facility, through the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), to request the imposition of temporary emergency flying restrictions over the scene of an incident under certain circumstances. The most likely reason would be the safety of those in the air or on the ground. Requests for temporary emergency flying restrictions should be made through the Police Tactical Commander, who will review the necessity for such restrictions at regular intervals. The Air Support Unit is available 24/7 for advice and guidance in relation to airspace restrictions.

11. Investigation

11.1 Evidence

- 11.1.1 Most major incidents will be the subject of an investigation/inquiry, whether for HM Coroner, a public inquiry, or civil or criminal court proceedings, therefore evidence collected should be of the best possible quality.
- 11.1.2 In order to gather such evidence the scene must be secured as soon as possible and anything which can be reasonably anticipated to be required as evidence is preserved and not damaged, moved or disposed of without reference to the leading investigator.
- 11.1.3 Depending upon the nature of the incident several different agencies may carry out independent investigation. Protocols and a framework for effective liaison have been agreed with the following bodies:
- Air Accident Investigation Branch;
 - Marine Accident Investigation Branch;
 - Rail Accident Investigation Branch,
 - Health and Safety Executive (HSE),

NB: They require the early notification of an incident in order to coordinate its response.

The list of agencies is not exhaustive and the type of incident will dictate those agencies that may well have an investigation input.

- 11.1.4 Aerial photography, both video and stills, can help throughout the incident in recording the scene for evidential purposes, as will any other photographic evidence available.

11.2 Police responsibilities

- 11.2.1 In all suspected terrorist-related incidents The MPS Counter Terrorism Command SO15 will lead.
- 11.2.2 British Transport Police will lead in railway incidents other than those relating to Murder or Terrorism. Where the incident is of such a scale or there are special reasons, a joint team of BTP and local police may be formed, following discussions between senior officers of both services.

12. Safety

12.1 Safety and health

- 12.1.1 In the event of major incidents a wide range of both physical, psychological and safety hazards may be faced by both the public and the blue light service responders; all of which need to be managed appropriately if the safety of staff and the public is not to be put at unacceptable risk.
- 12.1.2 The police and other blue light services responding to a major incident need to quickly identify and manage hazards during the initial incident response and subsequent investigation and recovery stages.
- 12.1.3 The responsibility for health and safety of staff at a major incident rests with each agency respectively, but should be coordinated through the Strategic Commander.
- 12.1.4 An initial scene assessment (dynamic risk assessment as part of the Joint Decision Model) will need to be undertaken in an attempt to identify any immediate potential hazards to staff that may be expected to work at the scene/s.
- 12.1.5 To identify all significant hazards and to set a safety strategy the Tactical and Strategic Commanders should consider requesting that the responding agencies form an incident safety advisory cell to ensure continuity of hazard identification, and that risk control measures are appropriately managed by each agency. The incident safety advisory cell should comprise of a relevant multi-agency core of operational practitioners, health, safety and medical professionals and scientific advisors that are able to advise on the health, safety and aligned operational issues.
- 12.1.6 The incident safety advisory cell should:
- Set the strategy for safety;
 - Support the Tactical Commander:
 - Implement the operational plan and support the development of safety options to support informed operational decision making;
 - Coordinate an oversight of safety and health advice/support; (immediately to advise on the scene hazard profile, support assess/monitor hazards and activity, recovery and clean up etc.). Including:
 - Hazard profiling of the scene
 - Supporting the development of scene risk assessments and management of hazards including safe systems of work;
 - Provision of pragmatic safety advice for what can often be a dynamic changing scenario and environment

12.2 Factories and other industrial sites

- 12.2.1 Some locations, such as factories and other industrial sites, have a range of potential hazards including substances that are flammable, reactive, explosive or toxic. Sometimes the hazards are multiple (for example flammable and toxic) and may involve corrosive or radioactive materials.
- 12.2.2 For some sites there are specific emergency plans made under the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 1999. The Regulations apply mainly to the chemical and petrochemical industries, fuel storage and distribution, and businesses that:
- Store fuels, including gas.
 - Have large warehouses or distribution facilities.
 - Manufacture and store toxic, flammable or explosive materials.
- 12.2.3 In the context of COMAH incidents, the term 'major accident' is used by those agencies involved and should not be confused with the term 'major incident'. 'Major accident' means an occurrence (including a major emission, spillage, fire or explosion) resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment and leading to serious danger to human health or

the environment, immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances. A major accident necessarily entails the invoking of the relevant COMAH plan.

- 12.2.4 Enforcing authorities, including the Health and Safety Executive and Environment Agency, will need access to such locations following major accidents and may need to gather evidence.

12.3 Fire Brigade "HMEP" officers

- 12.3.1 Certain fire officers who have completed the Hazardous Material and Environmental Protection Course at the Fire Service College will be nominated as Fire Brigade 'Hazardous Material and Environmental Protection Officers (HMEPOs).

- 12.3.2 HMEP officers are mobilised to a range of incidents that involve or have potential to involve hazardous materials. They have the ability to liaise with the LFB scientific advisors or ask for their attendance if required. Where radiation is suspected or involved the HMEP officers will carry out the role of Radiation Protection Supervisors. The LFB scientific advisors will carry out the role of Radiation Protection Advisor in accordance with the Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999.

- 12.3.3 The role of the London Fire Brigade's Scientific Adviser is to provide relevant scientific and technical help to the fire brigade that will allow them (and the other emergency services) to resolve CBRN and Hazmat incidents in a rapid and safe manner with minimal risk to their personnel, the public, or the environment.

12.4 Rail Incidents – safe systems of work

- 12.4.1 The safety of personnel is paramount when working on or near the track.

- 12.4.2 With rail accidents the rail infrastructure controller has a key responsibility in terms of site safety. The rail infrastructure controller or operator should maintain close liaison with the emergency services during an incident to ensure a safe system of work has been established and is being maintained.

- 12.4.3 The primary rule for track safety is that emergency service personnel must avoid accessing the track unless they are accompanied by the appropriately qualified staff from the relevant infrastructure controller or operator. In the event of an emergency where there are people on the track that are in direct and immediate danger and urgent action is required to preserve human life, emergency services personnel may go on to the track. Such action should only be taken as a last resort and every effort should be taken to establish that it is safe to access the track first. In such circumstances personnel must conduct a dynamic risk assessment ensuring their safety remains paramount. The relevant railway controller or operator must be informed immediately that emergency services have taken such action and the reasons for doing so. There are existing agreements between emergency services and railway operators and these should be adhered to.

- 12.4.4 Personnel must always wear high-visibility clothing when working on or near the track. The number of personnel working at the scene should be kept to a minimum.

- 12.4.5 Request for 'power off' should also include 'trains stopped' and state the area that this is requested for. The reason for this is that trains operated by electricity will, as soon as the power is turned off, coast to the nearest station, should the signaling allow.

- 12.4.6 Apart from avoiding the danger of electrocution it must be realised that merely having the power switched off may not have the effect of stopping trains. Diesel-powered trains, for example, are not dependent on the electric power and often run on the same track as electrified trains.

- 12.4.7 A request for trains stopped and/or power off should be passed through the appropriate rail infrastructure control via the emergency services' control rooms or appropriately qualified staff from the rail infrastructure controller or operator on site. This same control or person will confirm that the request has been carried out and that it is safe to access the track.

- 12.4.8 There is a need to be clear which rail organisation controls the track involved. Network Rail will be the lead authority for rail incidents on its tracks and those of the London Overground. It will protect

the scene in consultation with the emergency services, and provide liaison at the scene through its rail incident officer (RIO).

For incidents on other rail property (London Underground, DLR and trams) the lead authority and primary liaison will be through a nominated (TfL company) Bronze e.g. Bronze London Underground etc.

12.4.9 It is obviously dangerous to go into the vicinity of the railway because of the railway equipment, electrified lines, overhead power and the movement of trains.

12.4.10 Automatic train operation may be operating, as in the case of Docklands Light Railway in the area of the incident; therefore it is essential that the relevant service procedures are complied with.

12.5 Railway Industry

12.5.1 To ensure an effective response to an incident on the rail network the industry can provide inputs on:

- Safety of personnel;
- General site safety;
- Specialist information on rolling stock and infrastructure (tunnels, services, etc.);
- Specialist input to investigation;
- Recovery equipment either owned or under contract.

12.5.2 London Underground operate a dedicated Emergency Response Unit (ERU). This unit is staffed continuously at locations across London. The ERU teams are trained in all aspects of Railway safety infrastructure, rolling stock and casualty extraction and body recovery duties. The ERU vehicles carry all equipment necessary to carry out any tasks relating to the railway. The ERU locations at Camden and Stratford have blue-light vehicles. These are driven by BTP drivers and available at all times.

13. Other assistance

13.1 Voluntary Aid Societies (VASs)

13.1.1 The London Voluntary Aid Societies are able to provide both general and specialist support to the emergency services, local authorities, health and other organisations as well as the public in a number of generic areas:

- Welfare
- Social and psychological aftercare
- Spiritual care & religious services
- Medical support
- Search & rescue
- Transport & escort
- Communications
- Documentation / Administration
- Financial services
- Equipment and other resources
- Training & exercising
- Animal welfare

13.1.2 These elements of support may be requested as required by more than one agency at any time but it is anticipated that local protocols within London may at times of particularly high demand determine priorities. However this does not imply that the emergency services or other agencies should not make enquiry of any part of VAS for appropriate resources if and as required.

13.1.3 The London Resilience – [London Voluntary Sector Capabilities Document](#) is the core document that indicates which Voluntary Organisation(s) may, most appropriately, be able to provide assistance at the scene of a Major Incident, close by (i.e. Rest Centre, Survivor Reception Centre or Friends and Relatives Reception Centre) or elsewhere. This document presently lists 41 specialist services that are available from the various VAS, described generically as:

- Medical Support Services
- Welfare Services
- Psychosocial Aftercare
- Transport & Escort
- Communications
- Documentation/Administration
- Financial services

This core document also lists equipment that may be provided through the various VAS. 21 items are named ranging from ambulances, first aid and medical to catering, generators, shelter, inflatable boats and fork lift trucks.

13.1.4 Whilst it is anticipated that the emergency services and other organisations will seek assistance from the VAS it should not assume that the response will necessarily be provided free of charge. Organisations should be aware of the protocol to be found in the London Resilience – London Voluntary Sector Capabilities Document and signed by various Voluntary Aid Societies relating to the ‘charging for services’, in some cases from the initial alert or in others at some later stage of the response and recovery process.

13.2 Churches Multi Incident Plan

- 13.2.1 The [Churches Multi Incident Plan](#) has been drawn up in consultation with the London Emergency Services, to enable clergy and representatives of London communities to make a quick and effective response in any major incident. This plan must be regarded as a flexible blueprint and be adapted to the demands of each incident. The plan allows for faith communities to minister and care for those injured at the scene of the incident and to offer care and comfort to friends, family and others caught up in the disaster.

13.3 Utility companies

- 13.3.1 The utility companies can be mobilised by any of the emergency services and will normally be coordinated by police in the first instance.
- 13.3.2 They are able to control gas, water and electrical supplies. They can also provide communications facilities.

14. Media liaison and Public Information

14.1 Introduction

The 24/7 media and the growth in social networking sites has meant that information about incidents and events is now more readily available. Speculation can quickly become fact and the needs of the emergency services to manage the information flow have never been greater.

The public have a need to know how it will be affected by an incident and what actions it should take to minimize its impact. Whilst the emergency response to an incident is often confined to the incident area, a wider impact can rapidly affect a far wider area. Effective communication with the public about an incident will minimize its wider impacts and increase the confidence of the public in the emergency services. This involves identifying specific audiences and the appropriate communication tools and messages to achieve this.

- 14.1.1 A major incident involving the joint work of the emergency services in the capital will inevitably attract significant and sustained interest from both national and international media.
- 14.1.2 The role of social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook can also lead to information circulating quickly around the world.
- 14.1.3 It is important that in dealing with the demands of the media, press officers from the emergency services, local authorities and partner agencies liaise and consult effectively with each other whilst respecting the differing roles and responsibilities of their individual services.
- 14.1.4 The media and social networking sites can be a useful mechanism in order to communicate essential advice to the public about how the incident could affect them and what actions they should take and also a useful source of information such as photographs and video footage taken by the public.

14.2 Joined up Communication

- 14.2.1 In the event of a major incident a GOLD Communication Group will be established with the heads of communication from the emergency services in London and partner agencies who may be involved.
- 14.2.2 This group will manage and coordinate the strategic media and communication issues in support of GOLD and the overall operational response.
- 14.2.3 It will normally be chaired by a senior police press officer who will report back to the operational GOLD coordinating group.
- 14.2.4 Members of this group and other press officers from the emergency services in London are part of the London Comms First Alert System where information can be shared securely and quickly via e-mail, text or pager. The group also has the ability to take part in conference calls to pass on information, actions and highlight any broader media/communication issues that need to be addressed.

14.3 Statements

- 14.3.1 Once a major incident has been declared all the emergency services involved will be under pressure to provide an immediate statement. The police will be responsible for giving an overview of the situation and their operational response, but the other emergency services and response partners would be expected to give details about their own operational response.
- 14.3.2 It is good practice to put any press statements on an organisation's website and to disseminate these more widely using social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook.
- 14.3.3 The media monitor social networking sites and will often report messages that are being posted from organisations and eye witnesses.
- 14.3.4 All emergency services and response partners should ensure that they share statements with each other at the earliest opportunity.

- 14.3.5 Care should be taken that press statements are not contradictory and do not impinge upon or undermine the actions of the other services. Different groups of the public may need a different message delivered via varying formats.
- 14.3.6 No information should be provided to the news media in relation to a terrorist incident without authority of the Counter Terrorism Command. A Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) aide mémoire outlines the policy.

14.4 Media RVP

- 14.4.1 A media RVP - where the press can base themselves close to the scene - should be designated at the earliest opportunity.
- 14.4.2 This will be decided following consultation with the lead organisation's press officer and Tactical and Strategic Commanders.
- 14.4.3 The media RVP should be close to the site of the incident, but should not impinge on the operational response. When deciding where this should be based, consideration needs to be given to the possibility that media organisations may want to bring in heavy equipment, such as cherry pickers.
- 14.4.4 In the event of an incident over multiple sites, media RVPs should still be designated close to the various scenes, but a multi- agency media centre could also be established to handle and deal with press conferences and briefings.

14.5 Multi Agency Media Centre

- 14.5.1 In the event of an incident over several sites, a multi agency media centre could be established. The location of this centre will be decided based on the circumstances at the time and following consultation between the Police press officer and the Tactical and Strategic Commanders.
- 14.5.2 The media centre would be the focal point for press conferences, briefings and interviews by the designated spokespeople from the emergency services.

14.6 Designated Spokespeople

- 14.6.1 Experience has shown that Commanders at all levels are usually too busy to be effective spokespersons. The advent of 24-hour television and radio news means there is a round-the-clock demand for an official spokesperson to provide media facilities during a major incident.
- 14.6.2 It is good practice for organisations to designate a senior officer to fulfill this role.

14.7 Press Briefings at a Scene

- 14.7.1 Hundreds of media representatives can be expected to turn up at the scene(s) of a major incident. Each broadcast news organisation is likely to have more than one camera crew and reporter present and newspapers will send several journalists and photographers. The obvious practical difficulty in briefing such a large group is that many journalists will be unable to hear or see.
- 14.7.2 In the event that it is not possible to brief the media all in one go, two or more briefings could be held, separating the 'press pack' into groups of television & radio and written journalists & photographers. Alternatively, access to the briefings could be limited to one reporter/journalist and one film crew/photographer from each news organisation.
- 14.7.3 A pooled media facility should be considered only as a last resort.

14.7.4 When planning timings of press briefings, consideration should be given to the needs and demands of the international media who will be working to different time zones.

14.8 Preliminary Briefings

14.8.1 Preliminary briefings should be undertaken as soon as possible but ideally within 30 minutes of the first press officer and police spokesperson arriving on scene. The media will appreciate that information at such an early stage is limited but will never the less expect answers to certain questions.

14.8.2 Some points that should be considered for the first media briefing include:

- Time of incident;
- Specific details of any vehicles, trains or aircraft involved (e.g. 08.30 express from Manchester to Euston);
- Broad description of what is believed to have occurred (without apportioning blame);
- General description of scene;
- Whether or not there are casualties. Do not speculate on number of fatalities;
- Whether anyone is trapped;
- Hospital(s) dealing;
- Casualty Bureau telephone number;
- Reassurance that the emergency services are coping;
- Public information e.g. evacuations, road closures, advice about travel etc.;
- Time of next briefing.

14.9 Tailored Messages

14.9.1 There may be a need to tailor messages to different target audiences depending on the particular major incident.

14.9.2 These sort of issues will normally be identified and addressed through the GOLD Communication Group.

14.10 Joint Emergency Services Press Briefings

14.10.1 Although each emergency service organises and delivers its own interviews with the media, it has become practice at recent major incidents for joint emergency services briefings to be held either at the scene or at the multi- agency media centre.

14.10.2 This partnership approach demonstrates that the operation is a joint effort carried out professionally by everyone involved.

14.10.3 It falls to the police press officer on scene or at the multi agency media centre to organise and manage these briefings.

14.11 Citizen Journalists

14.11.1 The media no longer have to wait for camera crews/photographers to reach the scene of an incident before they can obtain images. Advances in technology mean that the public now have the ability to take still photographs and video from mobile telephones. The media refer to these people as 'citizen journalists'.

14.11.2 The media now actively encourage people to send their images to newsroom for broadcast.

14.11.3 Emergency service personnel need to be mindful that although there might not be media on scene, images taken by 'citizen journalists' could quickly appear on TV news channels and on social networking sites.

14.12 Media Accreditation

14.12.1 The bona fide media should carry a 'UK Press Card' that is recognised by ACPO. The card does not carry an automatic right of access to the scene of an incident or authority to pass police lines. However, officers are expected to be helpful to cardholders and where possible try to accommodate their needs.

14.12.2 With the growth in citizen journalists it is important that police distinguish between the main stream media and members of the public. Police should ask to see media representatives 'UK Press Card' before allowing them access to the media RVP or multi agency media centre.

14.12.3 Foreign journalists based in London may not hold the ACPO recognised card. Where possible, co-operation should be extended to them on production of appropriate/current ID and if necessary following consultation with the police press officer.

14.13 Release of Casualty Figures

14.13.1 It is appreciated that there will be a constant media appetite for figures on the number of fatalities. In the early stages of an incident we should confirm that there are casualties - if this is the case - without going into detail about numbers.

14.13.2 When in a position to do so the London Ambulance Service (LAS) will be responsible for giving details of the number of casualties treated and conveyed to hospital. The LAS press office may confirm the general nature and types of injuries and the hospitals to which people have been taken to, unless police specifically request them not to do so.

14.13.3 It will be the responsibility of the police to release the number and details of any fatalities.

14.13.4 There should be no speculation on fatality figures and the police should only confirm the number of dead after they have a true and accurate picture.

14.13.5 Confirmed fatality figures may only be released after consultation with police Gold.

14.14 Liaison on scene

14.14.1 Press officers attending the scene of the incident should seek out their counterparts at the earliest opportunity and establish regular liaison.

14.14.2 Prior to any press briefing it is advised that press officers and their spokespeople gather together and agree who is going to talk about what, identify any contentious issues and discuss how these can be dealt with.

14.15 Local Authority

14.15.1 If the local authority is involved in dealing with the incident and sends a press officer to the scene they should be incorporated into the press officer liaison process.

14.15.2 Alternatively press officers from local authorities can liaise by telephone to be informed of any media statements, which have a direct bearing on their organisation.

14.16 Transport for London

14.16.1 If Transport for London are involved in responding to the incident and sends a press officer to the scene, they should be incorporated into the press officer liaison process.

14.16.2 Alternatively press officers from Transport for London can liaise by telephone or be informed of any media statements which have a bearing on their organisation.

14.17 Tactical and Strategic Coordinating Group Meetings

14.17.1 Ideally, a senior press officer will attend both Tactical and Strategic coordination meetings.

14.17.2 Any media or communication issues identified from these meetings will be fed back to the other emergency service press offices and the GOLD Communication Group for information and action as necessary.

14.18 Press Debrief

14.18.1 Following any major incident the GOLD Communication Group will hold a post incident debrief. The debrief will identify best practice and any lessons and this information will be fed back into the wider operational debrief.

15. Occupier's response to an incident

15.1 General

- 15.1.1 It is to be expected that any occupier of premises within a cordoned area, be they residential or business occupiers, would want to gain access to their premises as soon as possible. It should be noted that the term premises could be extended to include extensive sites and industrial areas where a major incident may have occurred and impacted on daily business, e.g. rail networks, chemical sites, airports.
- 15.1.2 Responding agencies will wish to restore as much normality as possible as quickly as they can.
- 15.1.3 The area around a major incident is a potential crime scene and the police and other investigators need to carry out a painstaking enquiry to gain material evidence. This could take some time and, during that period, people will be excluded from the area so that vital evidence is not lost.
- 15.1.4 Damage caused by the incident may make the area unsafe to enter. The local authority would exercise its powers under the Building Act (1984) to remove those imminent dangers that represent a major safety hazard. It may be considered unsafe to allow owners to move in and attempt to deal with their properties simultaneously. In such cases, in the interest of public safety, the local authority may engage approved contractors to board up and commence repair work.

15.2 The Inner cordon

- 15.2.1 An inner cordon may well be in place for a prolonged period. However, the boundaries could be redrawn once the search for evidence has been completed, but the immediate area may be out of bounds for days or in some instances, weeks.
- 15.2.2 The London Fire Brigade (LFB) is responsible for coordinating safety within the inner cordon. Subject to LFB and all relevant safety advice, police may allow a limited number of people to enter their premises to undertake damage assessment or retrieval of some items for a few minutes or hours.

15.3 The Outer cordon

- 15.3.1 The police will aim to keep drawing in the outer cordon so that, at any time, only areas that have yet to be cleared for safety are within it. As premises are progressively freed from the cordon, occupiers will need to be on hand to secure their premises as soon as they are released.
- 15.3.2 The police, assisted by the local authority, will ensure that occupiers likely to be affected are given sufficient advance notice of the movement of the cordon boundaries.
- 15.3.3 During a prolonged incident the redefining of cordon areas will be continually re-assessed.

16 Debriefing

16.1 General

- 16.1.1 At some stage, when the incident has ended, each of the services and agencies involved in the incident will hold a series of operational debriefs. Initially these will be confined to each particular service, but later a multi-agency debrief will be convened by the agency who declared a Major Incident and lessons learnt will be managed according to the London Lessons Learned policy and JESIP Joint Organisational Learning work stream.
- 16.1.2 Multi-agency debriefs should consider the contribution provided by other, non-emergency service agencies to expand the knowledge and learning process that debriefs should collate. This is notwithstanding the potential conflict of interest that may result in later investigations. This aspect should be considered when inviting agencies other than emergency service to the debrief.
- 16.1.3 Operational debriefs should not be confused with diffusing welfare sessions for staff, which should form part of the trauma support programmes arranged by individual organisations.
- 16.1.4 The thrust of any such debriefs would be to identify areas for improvement in procedures, equipment and systems. They should not be forums for criticising the performance of others.
- 16.1.5 Debriefs should not interfere with or comment on investigations into the incident carried out by investigative or judicial authorities.
- 16.1.6 It is important to realise that such debriefs and related documents would be disclosable to individuals involved in legal proceedings.

17 Welfare of responders

17.1 General

- 17.1.1 Recent incidents have shown that welfare and trauma support should be made available to staff of organisations deployed in major incident scenarios. This support should be available from the very outset and early stages of the incident, where required and if requested by individual organisations. The responsibility for identifying the need for welfare support rests jointly with the individuals, their managers and the department within each organisation with responsibility for staff welfare.
- 17.1.2 Those who are particularly traumatised will require skilled professional help and this is now provided by all the services involved. Arrangements for this must be made in a way that ensures confidentiality and overcomes the cultural resistance in the emergency services to such a step. These facilities should also be made available to support staff even if they are not directly involved at the scene, e.g. administration staff, drivers and communication staff.

Appendix A – CBRN Incidents

A.1 Introduction

A.1.1 In recent years there has been an increased awareness of the threat posed by a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attack. The methodology of this attack may involve the use of explosives to assist in the dispersal of the hazardous material or some other form of dispersion whether overt or otherwise. It must also be considered that a terrorist may try to obtain Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) or Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs) - for example pesticides - to use in a chemical device. The threat from a CBRN device is significant, not only as a result of its activation but also in the fear and panic that it would create within the public and media and the considerable resources that would be required in the decontamination and restoration to normality following such an attack.

A.1.2 The following are brief descriptions of CBRN attack methods:

C – Chemical. A chemical attack would involve some form of chemical agent and a method of disseminating the material. The characteristics and effects of these chemical agents could range from causing respiratory distress, blistering to the skin and in the worst case scenario, death.

B – Biological. A biological attack may involve the dispersal of bacteria, a virus or toxins and this material could be disseminated by a variety of methods including the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), a mechanical sprayer or the covert contamination of foodstuffs or the environment. The effects of this biological attack may not be immediately apparent as an exposed victim may not present visible symptoms for some period of time post exposure.

R – Radiological. These devices may contain a quantity of radioactive material as the payload of an Improvised Explosive Device. This is called a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) also known as a “Dirty Bomb”. When a radiological dispersal device functions, the radioactive material is dispersed rendering the contaminated area potentially hazardous to health until a decontamination process is instigated to remove the danger. Exposed victims may be contaminated or irradiated depending on the method of attack and the radiological material used.

Another method of attack may involve an unshielded radioactive source being left in a public place emitting radiation. Depending on the received dose there maybe health effects leading to Acute Radiation Syndrome (also known as radiation sickness). Also, severe radiation exposure will increase the probability of developing cancer in later life.

N – Nuclear. The lack of capability of terrorist groups to obtain special nuclear material and the considerable scientific and engineering expertise required to create an improvised nuclear device, make this the least likely mode of attack. However, terrorists could potentially obtain such a device from the existing nuclear stockpiles across the world.

A.1.3 The presence of radiological or nuclear devices can be detected by radiological detection, identification and monitoring (DIM) equipment that measures radiological activity levels. Survey meters and Electronic Personal Dosimeters (EPDs) are examples of such equipment.

A.1.4 The presence of chemical or biological agents is more difficult to detect prior to release. However, once activated the effects of a chemical device are likely to create a reaction from the victims which can be confirmed by emergency services assessment teams using chemical detection, identification and monitoring equipment.

A.1.5 In the case of a biological attack the effects will not be immediately visible after activation and may only come to the attention of the emergency services via a health service disease monitoring programme.

A.1.6 A LESLP response in line with the procedure laid out in this Manual will be required for both pre and post activation of a suspected CBRN device. All three emergency services have personnel who have been trained and equipped to deal with the specialist response that is required for such an incident.

A.1.7 The main functions of the emergency services and other agencies at a CBRN incident are the same as those laid out in Section 3 of this Manual. However, both the London Ambulance Service (LAS) and London Fire Brigade (LFB) have additional responsibilities specific to the decontamination process.

A.1.8 Definition of decontamination:

Decontamination is the procedure employed to remove hazardous materials from people and equipment.

Clinical decontamination is the medical procedure to treat patients affected by or contaminated with hazardous materials. The prioritisation of casualties prior to decontamination requires the input of specialist National Health Service (NHS) staff.

Emergency decontamination is a procedure carried out when time does not allow for the deployment of specialist NHS resources and it is judged as imperative that decontamination of people is carried out as soon as possible. Improvised equipment may be used in lieu of dedicated facilities where it is imperative to remove hazardous material as soon as possible. It is recognised by all agencies that the implementation of emergency decontamination may carry risks to certain groups, for example, the elderly, the infirm and the injured. Irrespective of which agency commences decontamination, the process should fall under the clinical control of the NHS as soon as practicable to ensure the safe management of casualties.

Mass decontamination is the procedure to decontaminate people when the NHS, or the LAS on its behalf, has identified to the LFB that the number requiring decontamination has overwhelmed, or threatens to overwhelm, the Health Service's capacity. It may be for the LFB to initiate mass decontamination procedures prior to the arrival of the NHS or in circumstances where specialist NHS resources are not immediately available. This may be carried out via the improvisation of available equipment and facilities until dedicated supporting facilities can be resourced. It will be important to establish basic triage arrangements, involving both LAS and LFB personnel as soon as possible.

Appendix B – Incidents on Railways

B.1 Introduction

- B.1.1 The following section outlines an agreement that has been reached nationally between British Transport Police (BTP) and all Home Office forces. It repeats principles of responsibility which have worked well in the past, but which should be considered flexible as circumstances demand.
- B.1.2 All officers arriving at the scene will report to the senior officer present. That officer, whether from BTP, Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) or City of London Police (COLP) will perform the function of Police Tactical Commander. Where the first supervisor to arrive is from the MPS or COLP, it is recommended that the first BTP officer to arrive be appointed as liaison officer, where their specialist knowledge will prove useful.
- B.1.3 It is essential that the police response by the local force and BTP is coordinated so that there are no wasted resources or duplication of roles.
- B.1.4 The first officer of Inspector rank or above from either force will assume the role of Tactical Commander, taking responsibility for the initial co-ordination and deployment of resources from each force.
- B.1.5 On the arrival of their counterpart from the other force they will work together forming a team that ensures the resources, equipment and communications of both forces are used in the most effective way.
- B.1.6 In broad terms, the responsibility of each force is:

BTP on site, MPS or COLP off site. The specific responsibilities below are suggested as a guide and it is emphasised that as each incident and the resources available will be different in each case, flexibility, discussion and mutual co-operation are essential to ensure the coordinated response discussed earlier.
- B.1.7 The LFB has access to Channel 5 communications on all sub-surface railway incidents; other agencies now utilise TETRA radio for this purpose.

B.2 Police Responsibilities

- B.2.1 Agreement on responsibilities between BTP and the local police force will be subject to negotiation with all relevant local police forces at the outset of any major incident. Whilst most incidents on the railway fall within BTP's jurisdiction, the Commissioner for the police area where the incident occurs will always retain responsibility for their geographical area and local community. The agreement will be flexible and BTP Chief Officers should liaise with their corresponding counterparts from the local police force, in order that an effective police response is provided.
- B.2.2 Generally, in relation to uniform response, BTP will lead on matters within the inner cordon and on railway property, and the local police force will assist with the outer cordons and matters off railway property. Terrorist matters will have separate arrangements. BTP and the local police force will reach clear agreement on who is responsible for what functions relating to the major incident and discuss mutual aid dependent upon the circumstances. The local police force area where the major incident has happened will be extensively involved. There may be other police forces that assist the operation by providing specialist assets.
- B.2.3 The BTP Gold Commander will ensure there is clear agreement on who is responsible for what activities. At the scene, the BTP Silver Commander will do the same with the local police force Silver Commander to ensure that they understand each other's responsibilities. Clearly, each situation will be different dependent upon the nature and location of the event.

Appendix C – Aircraft Incidents

C.1 Introduction

- C.1.1 A major air incident is by its very nature an extremely sudden and catastrophic event, placing all the organisations concerned with the response under intense pressure. The scale of such events means their effects often cross administrative boundaries and involve a massive and lengthy recovery operation.
- C.1.2 Major incidents involving aircraft that occur within airfield boundaries will involve a local response based upon Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) directions.

C.2 Specific site hazards

- C.2.1 A major air accident will produce a toxic environment at the scene and all services responding should be aware of the need for extra attention to the identification of potential hazards and the protection of their staff. A crashed aircraft should be approached from an upwind direction whether there is a fire or not, due to the potential spread of toxic substances.
- C.2.2 In addition to the London Fire Brigade, both the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) and MOD are able to advise on potential hazards from crashed aircraft and the materials present in specific aircraft types. The Joint Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Squadron ((JARTS) at MoD Boscombe Down can provide the relevant information for military aircraft. The RAF Centre for Aviation Medicine and the Institute of Naval Medicine can provide scientific advice and deploy an Environmental Health Technician if required.
- C.2.3 This information can also be obtained via the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre Kinloss Barracks. They can fax hazard information to any emergency service on request.

C.3 Organisations involved

C.3.1 Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)

The AAIB investigates all civil aircraft accidents that occur in the UK and helps in the investigation of military accidents at the request of the Ministry of Defence. There are a number of statutory powers associated with this role through the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations 1989. These regulations gave the AAIB powers of investigation relating to the management of the scene. Close liaison between the AAIB investigators and the emergency services at the scene is essential at the earliest possible opportunity.

- C.3.2 Police will be responsible for contacting the AAIB on being informed of an incident. The initial AAIB response to a major air accident will consist of a small team of pilots and engineers who will work with RAF pathologists, where necessary. The police investigation will be carried out in close co-operation with that of the AAIB.

C.3.3 Ministry of Defence

The MOD (Military AAIB) will deal with post-crash recovery for all military aircraft accidents and has the capability to help with civilian incidents, where requested, particularly with wreckage removal in line with AAIB guidance. The unit involved is the JARTS, currently based at RAF Boscombe Down. RAF search and rescue (SAR) resources may be alerted by calling the Air Rescue Coordination Centre (Kinloss) duty officer.

C.4 Aircraft Incident Categories

- C.4.1 In order for the emergency services and aerodrome authorities to understand the nature of an emergency they have been defined using the following categories for use during a prescribed incident. Slight local variations between aerodromes may exist though the broad outline of the definition remains the same. Air Traffic Control (ATC) will usually make the initial decision on the category of emergency. Subject to threat assessment by the police and aerodrome authority there may be occasions when a response to a bomb warning is required to an aircraft either in the air, on the ground or on aerodrome premises.

C.4.2 Full Emergency

When ATC know or suspect that an aircraft in flight is known or suspected to be in difficulties which, if aggravated, could result in an accident.

C.4.3 Aircraft Ground Incident

When ATC becomes aware of or suspects that an aircraft on the ground is involved in an incident of a lesser nature than an aircraft accident. The incident may have caused aircraft damage, have the potential to result in aircraft damage or put the passengers and crew at risk.

C.4.4 Aircraft Accident Imminent

When ATC considers an aircraft accident is inevitable, either on or in the vicinity of the airport.

C.4.5 Aircraft Accident

When ATC becomes aware that an aircraft accident has occurred on the airport or within the airport boundary.

C.4.6 Aircraft Accident off Airport

When ATC becomes aware that an aircraft accident has occurred beyond the airfield boundary.

C.4.7 Hijack Full Emergency

Where ATC become aware that a person on an aircraft who, by the use of force or threat of any kind, intends to seize the aircraft or exercises control of it.

C.4.8 Act of aggression

An act of terrorism, armed attack, bomb attack, hostage situation (other than Hijack on an aircraft) or other similar acts of terrorism is taking or has taken place on or adjacent to the aerodrome boundary.

Appendix D – River Thames Incident

D1. Introduction

- D.1.1 This appendix only details Standard Operating Procedures for incidents on the tidal section of the River Thames that runs east, from Teddington Lock, downstream to the eastern Metropolitan boundary.
- D.1.2 The Port of London Authority (PLA) is the statutory harbour authority for the tidal Thames and is responsible for inter alia, managing navigational safety through the regulation of vessel traffic and marine operations, the conservancy of the tideway and for the provision of navigational information and advice.
- D.1.3 There are several unique features relating to the management of an incident on the tidal River Thames although the principles contained within the LESLP manual still apply.
- D.1.4 Sixteen riparian London boroughs and the Corporation of London are responsible for their respective stretches of the River Thames. (Detail of local authority assistance is contained within section 13).
- D.1.5 A hypothetical centre line along the River Thames acts as a boundary between boroughs on the north and south banks. Any incident occurring on the river is therefore likely to affect two or more London boroughs and/or the City of London.

D.2 Main functions of emergency services and agencies routinely involved in river SAR

D.2.1 HM Coastguard, London

- D. 2.1.1 London Coastguard (LCG) has primacy to the high water mark, for co-ordination of Search and Rescue (SAR) on the tidal section of the River Thames that runs between Teddington Lock and Canvey Island in Essex. This role involves the deployment and coordination of a civil SAR response to vessels or persons in the river environment in need of assistance.
- D.2.1.2 LCG is situated at the PLA's Thames Barrier Navigation Centre (TBNC), at Woolwich. This joint operational base accommodates Coastguard operations and PLA Vessel Traffic Services in Central London, (London VTS).
- D.2.1.3 Whilst recognising overall co-ordination of the wider major incident will at all times be the responsibility of the MPS, throughout the initial (rescue) phase, LCG will make operational and tactical decisions relating to the deployment and coordination of SAR resources. This commonly involves the deployment of the emergency service maritime resources referred to in this section.
- D.2.1.4 It should be noted that London Coastguard is a single person operator Coastguard station. During the initial stages of a major incident the Coastguard will as Maritime SAR Operational Commander (OC) concentrate on tactical deployment and early coordination of rescue craft. Where demand exceeds capability, immediate support will be provided via a dedicated communication link between London Coastguard and other Coastguard Operation Centers around the UK.
- D.2.1.5 LCG will be responsible for identifying and communicating to other agencies the most appropriate Casualty Landing Points (see D.3.3).

D.2.2 Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) – Lifeboats.

D.2.2.1 The RNLI's primary responsibility is the rescue of persons in distress. They have permanently manned Lifeboat stations on the River Thames at Gravesend, Tower (located North Embankment alongside Waterloo Bridge) and Chiswick, each having one fully crewed lifeboat at immediate readiness 24 hours a day. In addition, a fourth station at Teddington is crewed by volunteers who are available on call 24 hours a day. Thames Lifeboats are equipped with VHF Marine Band and Airwave radios.

D.2.3 Metropolitan Police - Marine Policing Unit (MPU)

D.2.3.1 The Marine Policing Unit (MPU) operates a 24-hour response from their base at Wapping. MPU Patrol vessels are equipped with Airwave and VHF marine band radios.

D.2.3.2 The MPU will, during the early stages of any incident, be responsible for liaison between LCG and the MPS Special Operations Room (call sign GT).

D.2.3.3 For land based police response see section 3.2.

D.2.4 London Fire Brigade (LFB)

D.2.4.1 London Fire Brigade (LFB) has two rapid response vessels, one of which is operationally available 24 hours. These vessels are equipped with LFB, VHF marine band and Airwave radios.

D.2.4.2 All LFB front line appliances are equipped with water rescue equipment including throw lines and hose inflation kit, with water rescue trained staff capable of coordinating a bankside rescue. In addition LFB has 10 Fire Rescue Units strategically located across London, equipped with emergency rescue boats and mud paths. These vessels are crewed by specialist swift water rescue trained staff. All appliances and these units are equipped with Airwave radios and LFB radios.

D.2.4.3 For land based fire response see section 3.3.

D.2.5 London Ambulance Service (LAS)

D.2.5.1 The LAS do not have a marine response capability.

D.2.5.2 For land based London Ambulance Service response see section 3.4

D.2.5.3 A representative from the LAS will liaise with LCG and the police in determining the most appropriate locations for casualty landing points (CLPs) and casualty clearance.

D.2.6 Port of London Authority (PLA)

D.2.6.1 The PLA Harbour Master has extensive statutory powers to regulate river traffic and the use of the River by the public in an emergency situation. The PLA retains primacy for the overall management of non-SAR emergency incidents within port limits.

D.2.6.2 London Vessel Traffic Services (London VTS) operated by the PLA, will manage and maintain the safety of navigation outside and around the area of a major or complex incident and will if necessary, in conjunction with the emergency services, introduce a river exclusion zone.

D.2.6.3 PLA Harbour Service Craft operate from the Thames Estuary to Teddington between 06.00 to 02.00hrs. Outside these hours, crews are on call.

D.2.6.4 PLA diving, hydrographic and counter pollution resources are based at Gravesend.

D.2.7 Environment Agency

D.2.7.1 The Environmental Agency is the Navigation Authority for the non-tidal Thames upstream of Teddington Lock.

D.2.8 Assistance of other Vessels

D.2.8.1 There is a statutory duty on the master of a vessel to go to the assistance of another vessel or person in distress. Public involvement may thus play a greater role than would otherwise be expected in a land based incident.

D.2.8.2 London Coastguard will communicate with and coordinate the involvement of non SAR vessels.

D.3 Tidal River Environment and Risk

D.3.1 Emergency service personnel attending river incidents should be mindful that;

- The river Thames in Central London has a tidal range that can exceed 7.1 meters and tidal rate that can exceed 5MPH.
- Tidal influence is likely to result in the incident drifting and incident scene expanding, in some instances by quite considerable distances.
- Persons in the river are at risk from surface and underwater hazards and strong undercurrents, whilst low water temperature can quickly sap a person's strength and reduce body temperature to life threatening levels.
- Under shallow water and along the exposed foreshore there are pockets of soft deep mud that can trap the unwary.

D.3.2 At low water, bodies and other evidence from the scene may be washed up and deposited on exposed stretches of the foreshore. It may also prove necessary to protect an incident scene by providing cordons.

D.3.2 The safety of personnel recovering evidence from, or covering foreshore cordons must always be risk assessed and strictly controlled to ensure personnel do not become trapped in soft mud or put at risk of becoming trapped by a rising tide.

D.3.3 Each agency will be responsible for conducting its own risk assessments in relation to safety of staff and vessels operating within a maritime environment.

D.3.4 Emergency service river resources are finite and, subject to ongoing risk assessment of priorities, can generally be expected to give precedence to the rescue of casualties at immediate risk of drowning over the recovery of casualties from vessels that remain afloat.

D.4 SAR Incidents in the Non Tidal Thames

D.4.1 The operating procedures within appendix D apply only to River Thames tidal waters and exposed riverside up to high water mark.

D.4.2 LFB and MPS will jointly be responsible for the provision of resources and the coordination of SAR for incidents occurring on the non-tidal section of the Thames within the London area.

D.4.3 It should be noted that Teddington lifeboat can operate as far west as Moseley Lock and may be the most readily deployable maritime SAR resource available.

D.4.4 London Coastguard (LCG) will, if operationally possible, deploy Teddington Lifeboat and support maritime SAR operations coordinated by LFB or the MPS in the non-tidal section of the River Thames, in accordance with the standard procedures contained within this manual.

D.5 Scene Management

D.5.1 Cordons

D.5.1.1 The PLA in consultation with the MPU and LCG will maintain safety of navigation around the incident and may establish a river exclusion zone. The MPU River incident Operational Commander (OC) is likely to be involved in any initial SAR response coordinated by LCG. At the conclusion of the SAR phase, the MPU River incident OC is likely to assume responsibilities connected with policing the river incident/crime scene.

D.5.1.2 Landside Cordons will be introduced as necessary by landside Police OCs. They should, where possible, reflect the movement of river cordons and take account of the river environment risks (see D3).

D.5.2 Rendezvous Points (RVP)

D.5.2.1 Landside RVPs for river incidents are to be designated by police, once LCG has confirmed the location/s of riverside Casualty Landing Points (CLPs).

D.5.3 Casualty Landing Points (CLPs)

D.5.3.1 Access to the River Thames is limited and can be hazardous: consequently CLPs have been pre-identified. These points are listed and circulated by LFB to all emergency services, river agencies and riparian boroughs. CLPs have been selected so that any casualty, no matter how seriously injured, can be landed at any state of the tide. They are accessible by road and are usually piers.

D.5.3.2 When a SAR incident occurs on the river, LCG will establish its location and designate the most suitable CLP, consulting if necessary with the other emergency services and the PLA. Whilst a single CLP has been found most effective, consideration will be given to using any number of CLPs on either or both sides of the river, sometimes significant distances apart.

D.5.3.3 An ambulance officer will attend each CLP in order to keep Ambulance Control informed as to the number and condition of casualties.

D.5.3.4 Designated CLPs must be protected by land based police resources.

D.5.3.5 Ambulance and police accounting for casualties are advised that casualties in the river can quickly drift a significant distance from the incident scene and may be recovered by vessels or by person's landside who have little or no awareness of the incident. These casualties are unlikely to be transferred back to the designated CLP, may prove difficult to account for and lead to extended river search activity.

D.5.4 Joint Emergency Services Control Centre (JESCC) or Forward Control Point (FCP)

D.5.4.1 Due to tidal flow, the position of the incident scene is likely to change, making it necessary to regularly review and where appropriate, move cordon positions and access points. The positioning of the JESCC (FCP) must therefore be selected with care as it's unlikely to prove practical to change its location once established.

D.5.4.2 For the reason outlined, consideration should be given to establishing the JESCC (FCP) at a remote but suitably equipped Command Centre. This could be the MPS Special Operations Room (normally referred to as GT) or the London VTS Emergency Response Centre at Thames Barrier Navigation Centre.

D.5.4.3 A decision regarding its location should only be agreed by the Police Tactical Commander (TC) after consulting with all emergency services involved including LCG, MPU and PLA.

D.5.4.4 The officer from each service nominated to perform the function of TC will normally operate from the land-based JESCC although it may be considered useful for one or more TCs or for members of the Tactical Coordinating Group to board a vessel to obtain a first-hand view of the scene.

- D.5.4.5 For Major Incidents occurring on or directly affecting safety on the River Thames, HM Coastguard and the PLA will seek to send a Tactical Commander or their representative to the designated JESCC (FCP). Where this proves problematic, particularly during the early stages of the incident, the Police TC is encouraged to facilitate remote attendance of Coastguard and PLA representatives at command meetings by making use of telephone conference services.

D.5.5 On-Scene Coordinator

- D.5.5.1 The Coastguard OC may, due to the size and complexity of the operation, decide to appoint an appropriately experienced person on a vessel as Maritime On-Scene Coordinator (OSC).
- D.5.5.2 The role of Maritime OSC is recognised within International Maritime Law as that of a person capable of overseeing, communicating with and locally coordinating a number of other vessels directly involved in a waterside SAR operation on behalf of the Coastguard OC.
- D.5.5.3 During major maritime incidents on the Thames it is possible that more than one OSC will be appointed to assist with the coordination of separate incidents within the greater incident.
- D.5.5.4 Contact with any designated maritime OSC by landside resources is to be through London Coastguard.
- D.5.5.5 Vessels used by OSCs and any outer river cordon vessel (when deployed) should, where possible, be clearly distinguishable to other vessels by using blue flashing lights. Other vessels within the exclusion zone should not use blue lights.

D.5.6 Scene Access Control

- D.5.6.1 River based units deployed within the incident will be logged by LCG. Other river traffic will be excluded from the incident scene by London VTS and designated vessels enforcing river closures.
- D.5.6.2 Land based police are responsible for landside scene access control.

D.5.7 River Command Arrangements

- D.5.7.1 Waterside - Air, land or river assets from any emergency service or agency available and capable of assisting directly with the maritime search and rescue response will be coordinated by the Coastguard OC, notwithstanding that whilst assisting the Coastguard, emergency service assets remain at all times under the control of the designated service or agency.
- D.5.7.2 Landside - It can be anticipated that land based resources will attend the incident from both sides of the river. Services responding to a river based incident should consider deploying separate Operational Commanders on both the north and south bank of the river Thames.
- D.5.7.3 Police and LFB OCs will be responsible for the management of resources and access control along the waterfront, in support of waterside response activity.

D.6 Communications

- D.6.1 Maritime Incidents are routinely coordinated by HM Coastguard on Marine Band VHF Radio Channel 0. VHF Channel 0 is dedicated to SAR coordination and restricted for emergency service use. This channel is fitted on all RNLI and emergency service vessels that routinely operate on the Thames.
- D.6.2 London Coastguard also has limited ability to coordinate maritime incidents using Tetra Airwave.
- D.6.3 The Metropolitan Police Airwave talk group dedicated to maritime SAR in London is PMPS ES3. This talk group is accessible to all emergency services. Whilst Airwave provides greater security and interoperability between river and landside emergency services, its use by LCG is not always preferred over the benefits provided by marine band VHF.

- D.6.4 The London Coastguard OC will at the outset of a major incident determine the most appropriate radio communication system to be used as the primary SAR coordination channel and inform all emergency services and agencies involved.
- D.6.5 In the Metropolitan area, PLA (London VTS) communicates by radio with vessels using the Port Safety of Navigation working channel, VHF Marine band Channel 14. In the event of a major incident the PLA, in consultation with the Coastguard will inform, update and provide instructions to commercial and leisure vessels in the vicinity of the incident.

Appendix E – Flooding

E.1 Introduction

E.1.1 The effects of climate change mean that flooding is more likely to become an increasingly common event, which could affect both urban and rural parts of London. Flooding may be localised but occur simultaneously across London amounting to a series of major incidents, which may be short term or protracted.

Rivers are classified by the Environment Agency as main rivers and ordinary watercourses. The Agency is responsible for the flood prevention measures on main rivers. Ordinary watercourses are the responsibility of various bodies such as local authorities and other landowners.

E.2 Types of flooding

E.2.1 There are four types of flooding, the responses to which are similar:

- fluvial;
- tidal;
- flash floods and
- burst water mains.

E.3 Flood warnings

E.3.1 The Environment Agency is only responsible for the issue of flood warnings in respect to main rivers. These warnings are categorised as:

- **Flood Alert**



FLOOD ALERT

FLOODING IS POSSIBLE. BE PREPARED.

- **Flood Warning**



FLOOD WARNING

FLOODING IS EXPECTED. IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED.

- **Severe Flood Warning**



SEVERE FLOOD WARNING

SEVERE FLOODING. DANGER TO LIFE.

These warnings can be sent by fax, telephone, email, pager and text message to the emergency services, local authorities and other professional partners. The definitions and actions required upon receipt of such warnings are to be found in the Local Flood Warning Plan, Multi Agency Flood Plans and strategy document. Warnings are also sent by various means to people in the likely affected areas. Further information can be obtained by calling Floodline on 0845 988 1188 or visiting the Environment Agency website at www.environment-agency.gov.uk/flood

The Met Office issues warnings of severe weather, which give warning of the possibility of flooding from other sources.

E.4 Roles and responsibilities

E.4.1 The following are in addition to the roles and responsibilities mentioned throughout this Manual:

- **Police**

In the event of the agreed procedures for warning and informing communities at risk not being effective, then, where practicable, assistance will be given.

- **Fire Brigade**

Give assistance with pumping operations, depending on the situation prevailing at the time, priority being given to calls where flooding involves a risk to life, of fire or explosion and to calls from hospitals, residential homes for the elderly, public utilities and food storage depots. To assist other relevant agencies, particularly the local authority, to minimise the effects of major flooding on the community.

- **Ambulance**

The LAS may become involved in the evacuation of vulnerable persons and supporting the local authority. It should be noted that the LAS does not possess any waterborne response capability but does have staff trained to work on boats and in some water environments.

- **Local authority**

Provision of general advice and information in support of the Environment Agency to the public on flood prevention measures and environmental health issues, including encouraging those at potential risk of flooding to sign up to the Environment Agency's flood alert scheme.

London Boroughs may also provide further assistance to the public if resources permit, i.e. drying-out facilities, provision/filling or placing of sandbags where danger is foreseen.

Joint agency co-ordination of non-life threatening floods and of the recovery phase following a flooding incident.

- **Transport for London**

Undertaking the management and operational continuity of transport infrastructure such as roads and rail and the provision of public transport.

The provision of engineering and plant equipment at the request of the pan London Gold Coordinating Group or affected local authority Golds including the provision/filling or placing of sandbags where danger to life or infrastructure is foreseen.

E.5 Planning and response issues

E.5.1 In responding to the flooding incidents the following should be considered, particularly in the planning stages:

- risk assessment
- danger from flowing water (speed, force, currents, undertow) and submerged hazards
- local authority liaison officers for response and monitoring purposes
- equipment and training in its use (e.g. access to boats for **suitably trained** personnel, footwear, buoyancy aids, safety lines, flood-plain maps, local knowledge of flood effects)
- traffic diversion plan with sign locations (*see Section 67, Road Traffic Regulation Act, 1984*)
- Police Marine Support Unit, Port of London Authority, RNLI
- military assistance, e.g. sandbagging, specialist vehicles, etc. – Appendix F
- vulnerable persons, e.g. children, disabled, etc.
- vulnerable premises (e.g. occupied basements, electrical installations, sub-level car parks)
- contaminated water (hazard to rescue services as well as the public)
- supplies of drinking water
- guidance and health advice leaflets, newsletter, helpline, etc.
- early appointment of a flood recovery group
- rest centres – establishment and transport.
- use of LFB Bulk Media Advisors (BMA) who are specialist officers trained to assist with pumping of flood water. Their involvement in the planning process would be advantageous.

Appendix F – Military Assistance to a London Major Incident

F.1 References

- F1.1 • Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience – IJDP 02
- London Strategic Coordination Protocol 2014

F.2 Policy

- F2.1 Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) within the UK is subdivided into:

Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD). For example, G20, party conferences

Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP). E.g. Deployment of troops to Heathrow in 2002

Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC). E.g. Flooding winter 2013/14

For a major immediate impact event, the most likely assistance is unarmed military manpower for general duties tasks.

F.3 3 categories of MACC

- F3.1 Cat A – Emergency Assistance to the Civil Authorities in time of emergency such as natural disasters or major emergencies.
- F3.2 Cat B & C – Routine Assistance and Attachment of Volunteers are not applicable in a major incident in London.

F.4 3 principles guiding the provision of MACC:

Military aid should only be provided where the need for someone to act is clear and where other options have been discounted by the civil responder. The use of mutual aid, other agencies and the private sector must be otherwise considered as insufficient or be unsuitable.

The Civil Authorities making the request lack the required level of capability to fulfill the task and it is unreasonable to expect them to develop one.

The Civil Authority has the capability, but the need to act is urgent and it lacks readily available resources.

F.5 Authority to deploy

- F.5.1 Military resources are not specifically set aside for assisting in an emergency, so any assistance will depend on what assets are available at the time. Involvement by the military chain-of-command and Defence Ministerial approval is necessary for assets to be deployed.
- F.5.2 Armed Forces support must always be at the specific request of the Civil Authorities and in almost all circumstances requires the specific authorisation of Defence Ministers. In the event of a MACC Cat A event – emergency assistance, the General Officer Commanding London District has the authority to deploy personnel under his command immediately without reference to higher command if they can be immediately helpful in alleviating distress and saving lives and property.

F.6 Reaction to an 'Immediate Impact' Emergency

- F.6.1 For an 'immediate impact' event, HQ London District will task one of the Joint Regional Liaison Officers (JRLO) to attend the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC), if formed, and will provide a single point of contact for Military Aid requests (except Special Forces). All requests should be made through the Chair of the Gold Co-ordinating Group (GCG) for consideration by HQ London District Operations Centre and the Military chain-of-command.

F.6.2 Some niche capabilities, such as engineers, aviation, Search and Rescue and bomb disposal, are already used and their tasking and capabilities are well understood by the MPS and do not require Ministerial Approval.

F.7 General Capabilities

F.7.1 Able to provide the military command, control and communications based on HQ LONDIST enabling a 24/7 capability, in order to supervise and carry out tasks in support of and in co-ordination with the Emergency Services (ES) and Local Authorities.

F.7.2 Able to be logistically self supporting.

F.7.3 Able to be flexible and responsive, but operate only within own capabilities.

F.7.4 Personnel for unarmed general duties might be made through HQ LONDIST for the crisis and consequence management phases of a major 'immediate impact' emergency. These tasks might include:

- Reconnaissance. Deployment of small command teams to assist the Emergency Services in determining the extent of, and monitoring an incident.
- Public Control. Assistance to MPS in controlling access and crowd management, but short of involvement in maintenance of 'public order' which remains a police responsibility.
- Evacuation. Assist the police in the control or channeling of large numbers of public in the incident area.
- Route Guidance. Identification and securing of safe routes around the incident area.
- Cordons. Provision of personnel for cordons. A police presence would be expected perhaps on a ratio of 1: 5 soldiers.
- Access Control. Assisting police control at RV/access points. Provide marshals to control or channel large numbers of people in particular at RVs and access points.
- Media Handling. Assist in handling the media and other non-governmental agencies.
- Stores Protection and Distribution. Assist in protecting and transporting stores and supplies including medicines.
- Key Installations. Supporting the police to prevent looting and theft, particularly if key installations are directly affected by the incident.
- Mass Casualties. Personnel may be required to give limited emergency first aid, stretcher evacuation, aid to walking wounded, locating, securing and marking bodies or body parts and support to the medical services to enable access and evacuation.
- Engineering Tasks. The civil and local authorities will retain the lead on any civil engineering tasks but may be supported by Royal Engineer assets if available. Troops may be tasked to provide assistance with site search and safety checks, provision of flood or water defences and the use of boats and assistance with the removal of debris from areas where people might be trapped or where key facilities are buried.
- Temporary Accommodation. Secure, organise, and control emergency or temporary accommodation.
- Water and Feeding Points. In addition to integral catering and water, support troops may be asked to man and control both feeding points and water points at the site and assist with supply of food to areas of the incident.

- Rest Centres. Assist Local Authorities manage premises designated for temporary accommodation for evacuees.

F.7.5 Troops will always deploy as a self-contained formed body under command of an Officer or Non-Commissioned-Officer (NCO) throughout the period of military involvement. They will initially report to and work under the direction of the emergency services' Operational Commander. A Military Liaison Officer (MLO) will also deploy as the military point of contact at Operational, Tactical and Strategic levels.

F.7.6 After the immediate response to an incident, it is less likely that the military would be made available during the Consequence and Recovery phase of an emergency. However, the same caveats would apply should the RCCC seek support.

F.8 Reaction to a 'Rising Tide' Emergency

F.8.1 This is more likely to be a MAGD engagement. On the outset of a 'rising tide' emergency, military advice should be sought from HQ London District at Horse Guards, Whitehall, through the JRLOs. While informal discussion and contingency planning may take place at a local level, the Civil Authority must submit a formal request, through the Home Office to the MOD for military aid before the chain-of-command will take action.

F.8.2 Requests for MACA support should be submitted in good time and should articulate clearly not only the effect required, but also why military resources are needed to achieve it.

F.9 Contact Details, HQ London District

- Operations Officer (SO2 G3 Ops/O&D) 0207 - 414 - 2444
- Duty Officer (silent hours): 0207 - 414 - 2243
- JRLOs London District: A. 0207- 414 – 2252 Mob. 07760-300188
B. 0207- 414 – 2433 Mob: 07909-881409

F.10 Costs

F.10.1 Defence Funds are granted for Defence Purposes. Where work is done by the Armed Forces for other purposes, the MOD is required by 'Treasury Rules' to secure reimbursement for the costs incurred. MACA activity is, with few specific exceptions, such as the niche capabilities mentioned above, not funded within the MOD vote and is conducted on a repayment basis. This is normal practice within Government Departments. There are 3 charging levels:

F.10.2 'No cost' – costs would be waived where life is at risk or in other exceptional circumstances. The decision would normally be taken centrally but as stated in paragraph F.5.2 Commanders are empowered to respond immediately to save life. In a major 'immediate impact' situation a 'no-cost' basis is likely until the Recovery phase when the military will seek to withdraw or costs may at least start being assessed.

F.10.3 'Marginal' – Recover the costs that would not otherwise have been incurred by the MOD. This is applied when a task is undertaken on behalf of the civil authorities or another Government department for 'rising tide' events.

F.10.4 'Full Costs' – All costs, direct and indirect, incurred improvising assistance, including basic pay and allowances of personnel.

Appendix G - Glossary

Ambulance loading point	An area, preferably hard standing, in close proximity to the casualty clearing station, where ambulances can manoeuvre and load patients.
Body collection point	A point close to the scene (or holding area) where the dead can be temporarily kept until transfer to the mortuary. Ideally the premises should be secure, dry, and cool and have ample drainage.
Brigade control	Brigade's mobilising centre located at the London Operations Centre (LOC) in Merton.
Casualty	A person directly involved in or affected by the incident and rendered injured.
Casualty bureau	Central contact and information point for all records and data relating to casualties.
Casualty clearing station	An area set up at a major incident by the ambulance service in liaison with the medical incident officer to assess, treat and triage, sort casualties and direct their evacuation (<i>see Triage</i>).
CBRN	Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear – material that has potential to be adapted for use in a terrorist incident.
Controlled area	The area contained by the outer cordon that may be divided into geographical sectors.
Cordon	The perimeter of an area, for example the rescue zone or a sector (may be physical or improvised).
DDM	Designated Disaster Mortuary.
Emergency Medical Technician	A qualified NHS ambulance person who has obtained EMT, the Institute of Health Care Development Certificate in Ambulance Aid Training. They may also be permitted to administer specified drugs.
EOC	LAS Emergency Operations Centre.
EPA	A trained Emergency Planning Advisor who can provide advice and support to the Ambulance Incident Officers and others on matters relating to emergency planning and other ambulance service or NHS requirements.
Evacuees' assembly point	A location of safety, near the scene, where evacuees can initially be directed for assembly before being transported to rest centres.
FBC	The LAS Fallback Control facility at Bow.
Forward Command Point	Previously termed the JESCC; the FCP is where Police, London Fire Brigade and London Ambulance Service Control/Command Units co-locate, together with the public utilities and local authority. It should form the focus point from which the incident will be managed.
Friends and relatives reception centre	A FRRC is likely to be set up within first 24 hours of the incident occurring and should be a safe place for friends and relatives to gather where they can receive up-to-date information about the situation and response.

Humanitarian Assistance Centre	A facility where bereaved families, survivors and anyone else directly affected by an incident can receive information and appropriate support from all the relevant agencies, without the need for immediate referral elsewhere.
Hospitals, receiving	The hospitals to be alerted by the London Ambulance Service (LAS) to receive casualties in the event of a major incident. The LAS maintain a medical incident officer (MIO) pool and will invariably employ doctors from this group when the need for an MIO and support becomes apparent. Receiving hospitals must be adequately equipped to receive casualties on a 24-hour basis and able to provide, when required, the medical incident officer and a mobile medical/nursing team.
ICP	Incident Control Point.
LALO	Local Authority Liaison Officer. A trained officer who can advise on the local authority's response capability and who has authority to represent the local authority at the incident scene or the FCP. The LALO can communicate directly with the local authority in order to request the deployment of additional resources.
London Fire Brigade inter-agency liaison officer (ILO)	A trained and qualified officer who can advise and support incident support incident commanders, police, medical, military and other government agencies on the brigade's operational capacity and capability, to reduce risk and safely resolve incidents at which a brigade attendance may be required. This will include major incidents, complex or protracted multi-agency incidents, terrorist-related incidents, public order, domestic or any other situation that would benefit from attendance of the ILO.
LLACC	London Local Authority Coordination Centre
LRT	London Resilience Team.
LUL	London Underground Limited (a business unit of TfL)
MACA	Military Aid to the Civil Authority.
MACC	Military Aid to the Civil Community.
Marshalling area	Area to which resources and personnel from all services can be directed to stand by. Fire brigade reliefs may be directed there to be briefed before final deployment by LFB Tactical Command.
Marshalling officer	Service representative at marshalling area.
MCA	Maritime and Coastguard Agency.
Media centre	Central contact point for media enquiries, providing communications and conference facilities and staffed by press officers from all organisations.
MetCC-IR	Metropolitan Command Complex – Information Room at Lambeth (Previously CCC-IR).
MetCC-SOR	Special Operations Room at Lambeth (GT) (Previously CCC-SOR).
Overall Commander/ Strategic Commander (Gold)	Designated principal officer of each service who assumes the coordinating function for the operation as a whole on behalf of their service.

Paramedic	A qualified state registered NHS ambulance person who has obtained the Institute of Health Care Development Certificate in Extended Ambulance Aid Training. They may also be permitted to administer specified drugs.
PLA	Port of London Authority.
Police incident officer (PIO)	Tactical Commander (Silver).
Police media representative	Senior police appointee chosen by the overall incident commander to be responsible for the release of information on behalf of the police.
Press liaison officer (scene)	Representatives of each organisation responsible for the initial release of information from the scene of the incident reflecting coordinating group policy.
Press liaison point (PLP)	Premises at or adjacent to the scene designated for exclusive use by accredited media representatives and through which official press releases will be issued.
Rail incident commander (RIC)	For incidents on infrastructure controlled by Network Rail an incident commander will be appointed. This individual will operate at Gold level and will be remote from the scene.
Rail incident officer (RIO)	On Network Rail controlled infrastructure the rail industry response to an incident will be led, on site, by the RIO. The RIO will act as a point of contact for the emergency services. Representatives of the train operating companies (TOCs) and contractors will report to the RIO.
Rendezvous point (RVP)	A point selected by the emergency services as the location for all personnel and vehicles to report to before attending the major incident. It is situated within the outer cordon.
Rendezvous point officer	Police officer responsible for supervision of the RVP.
Rescue zone	The area within the inner cordon.
Resilience mortuary	A pre-designated location, which can be used as a mortuary if the scale of the incident renders existing facilities inappropriate. Such locations require detailed pre-planning and will be used at a centre for the examination and identification of the deceased.
Rest centre	Premises designated for the temporary accommodation of evacuees.
Resource Management Centre	London Fire Brigade centre located in Stratford that manages the operational resources of LFB. RMC also has a Gold Command suite (Fire only) for major events.
RNLI	Royal National Lifeboat Institution.
Scientific advisor	The fire brigade's qualified scientific and technical advisor at incidents involving hazardous and/or radioactive substances.
Sector/Operational Commander	The officer in command of an operational area and having functional responsibility within the controlled area for fire/rescue purposes. (Bronze)
Senior investigating officer (SIO)	Police senior detective officer appointed by Gold to assume responsibility for all aspects of the police investigation.

Silver Fire/Medic/Police	The service Tactical Commander (usually on the scene).
Senior identification manager (SIM)	This officer will have overall responsibility for the identification process and sit on the identification commission. Their responsibility would include body recovery, casualty bureau, family liaison and the post/ante-mortem teams.
STAC	The STAC is a strategic group chaired by the NHS composed of representatives from a range of organisations and specialties who are able to give coordinated authoritative advice on the health aspects of an incident to the Police Incident Commander, the NHS and other agencies.
Survivor Reception Centre (SRC)	Secure Police led area to which uninjured survivors can be taken for shelter, first aid, interview and documentation.
TBNC	Thames Barrier Navigation Centre at Woolwich.
TETRA	Terrestrial Trunked Radio Access.
TfL	Transport for London, the statutory regional transport authority for Greater London
Triage sieve	The primary triage system that quickly sorts out casualties into priority groups.
Triage sort	The secondary triage system that is carried out on the arrival of further resources usually taking place in the casualty clearing station.
TLRN	TfL Road Network
VASs	Voluntary Aid Societies.
VTS	Vessel Traffic Service at TBNC at Woolwich (PLA).

Appendix H - Marine Terminology

Above (a point)	Refers to the river upstream of a reference point, not vertically above it.
Below (a point)	Refers to the river downstream of a reference point, not physically underneath it.
Downstream (of)	That portion of the river which is closer to the estuary than the reference point, for example, 'downstream of Tower Bridge'.
Air draft	The height of a vessel from the water line to the top of its highest structure (mast or superstructure as appropriate).
Bridge clearance	The distance from any nominated point on the underside of a bridge to the water level, at any given state of the tide.
Ebb tide	A tide which flows from the river's source towards its estuary (downstream).
Fairway	The navigational channel.
Flood tide	A tide which flows from the river's estuary towards its source (upstream).
Foreshore	That portion of the river closest to the embankment which is covered by water except at low tide.
Non-tidal Thames	Above Teddington Lock the river is non-tidal and the water level remains constant except as it is affected by water entering the river from its tributaries.
Reach	A continuous stretch of a river that can be looked along between two bends.
Slack water	When the tidal stream is not moving.
Tidal Thames	That length of the river where the water level rises and falls due to tidal action. It extends from the estuary to Teddington Lock.
Upstream (of)	That portion of the river which is closer to the river's source than the reference point, for example, 'upstream of Tower Bridge'.

The above expressions remove the need to use compass points to locate a point that is difficult when the meandering nature of the river is taken into account.

Tidal flow is at its fastest and strongest mid-tide, that is half-way between high and low water. Tidal flow increases and decreases proportionally about the period of maximum flow.

There are a range of additional plans that are specific to London [available through London Resilience](#) and these should be referred to as necessary. This guidance is also intended for external partners, to assist with their own planning processes.

Whilst the Command and Control methods in this guidance have been developed for the response to Major Incidents, they can equally be adopted for other disruptive incidents, which require a multi-agency response.